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Unauthorized and Unwise: The
Lawful Use Requirement in
Trademark Law
Robert A. Mikos ∗
For decades, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
has required trademark owners to comply with sundry nontrademark laws
governing the sale of their trademarked goods and services. Pursuant to this
“lawful use requirement,” the Agency has refused or even cancelled registration
of thousands of marks used on everything from Schedule I controlled substances
to mislabeled soap. This Article subjects the Agency’s lawful use requirement to
long-overdue scrutiny. It suggests that in requiring compliance with other laws
for registration, the PTO has lost sight of the one statute it is supposed to
administer. In the process, the Agency has overstepped the limits of its statutory
authority and undermined federal trademark policy. Whether a mark owner
has used its mark to sell improperly labeled soap or an illicit drug, the PTO has
no mandate, and no convincing policy reason, to deny the owner the substantial
benefits of registration. Simply put, the Agency’s lawful use requirement has no
place in trademark law.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following questions, each of which has been asked
and answered by a certain federal administrative agency:
• To what extent does the 2018 Farm Bill legalize the sale of CBD
extracted from “hemp”?
• After the President sanctioned Russia for invading the Crimea,
are Russian arms manufacturers allowed to export their wares
to the United States?
• Does the sale of certain engine modification kits violate the
California Vehicle Code?
• Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, may commercial
banks offer insurance brokerage services?
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Is shampoo “soap,” and thus exempt from the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act’s labeling requirements?
If you were to guess which agency had the mandate and breadth
of expertise needed to tackle these questions—and many more—the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) would probably not
come to mind. After all, none of the questions posed has any obvious
connection to trademark or patent law. But then, perhaps you have
never heard of the Agency’s lawful use requirement for trademark
registration.
The PTO is responsible for administering the Lanham Act’s
trademark registration system, the nation’s invaluable repository of
marks already in use and therefore likely protected from infringement. 1
To register marks with the Agency, the Lanham Act requires mark
owners to use their marks in commerce—in essence, to sell goods with
their marks affixed to them. 2 But the PTO has gone a step further and
insisted that mark owners must comply with other laws when selling
their trademarked goods. 3 In other words, the sale of those goods must
be lawful. The failure to comply with this lawful use requirement,
whether by selling a Schedule I controlled substance or a mislabeled
bottle of shampoo, constitutes grounds for refusing or even cancelling
the registration of a mark.
Pursuant to its lawful use requirement, the PTO has
investigated violations of a breathtaking array of laws outside the field
of trademark law, including the Controlled Substances Act; 4 the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act; 5 the Amateur Sports Act; 6 the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; 7 the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; 8 the Endangered Species Act; 9 the International
•

1.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 876–78 (2017) (discussing the function and social value
of registration).
2.
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (requiring declaration that mark “is in use in commerce” for
registration). The statutory requirements for registration are discussed more fully infra, Section
I.A. Similar rules apply to service marks, but for ease of exposition, the Article focuses on
trademarks used on goods.
3.
E.g., Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 700, 702
(T.T.A.B. 1981) (“Trademark rights cannot accrue from unlawful commerce.”). Section I.B
discusses the requirement in detail.
4.
In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
5.
In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
6.
U.S. Olympic Comm. v. O-M Bread, Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
7.
Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 413 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1957).
8.
E.W. Bank Co. v. Plubell Firm LLC, No. 92053712, 2016 WL 5219824, at *13 (T.T.A.B.
Sept. 8, 2016).
9.
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 79226020 (Office Action, Feb. 20, 2018).
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Emergency Economic Powers Act; 10 the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations; 11 the Federal Meat Inspecting Act; 12 the Communications
Act of 1934; 13 the Federal Alcohol Administration Act; 14 and the Federal
Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 15 to name but a few, along with violations
of sundry state laws. 16 In the past decade alone, the Agency has refused
or cancelled registration of thousands of marks because it found that
the mark owner likely violated one of these, or countless other,
nontrademark statutes when selling its trademarked goods. 17
The lawful use requirement can have severe consequences for
any mark owner caught in the crosshairs of an inquiring trademark
examiner or a rival in an inter partes trademark dispute. Most
obviously, the mark owner loses the “significant, substantive
advantages” the Lanham Act confers on registered marks, including the
presumption that a registered mark is valid and constructive
nationwide notice that the registrant has staked a claim to it. 18 But the
consequences may extend beyond the loss of registration and its many
benefits. Following the PTO’s lead, a small but growing number of
courts have held that unlawful use also constitutes a defense to
infringement of a mark. 19 Thus, whether they seek registration or not,
mark owners are increasingly under the thumb of the lawful use
requirement.
10. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 79179932 (Office Action, Jan. 25, 2016).
11. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86503062 (Office Action, Apr. 3, 2017).
12. In re Cook, United, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 284 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
13. In re WSM, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 883 (T.T.A.B. 1985).
14. Great Adirondack Steak & Seafood Cafe, Inc. v. Adirondack Pub & Brewery, Inc., No.
91219162, 2017 WL 3670296 (T.T.A.B. June 8, 2017).
15. In re Indian Nation Leather Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1539 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
16. E.g., Facial Aesthetic Ctr. of Excellence Grp., Inc. v. Stewart Wang, M.D., Inc., No.
92044775, 2006 WL 3296210 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2006) (state business and professions code);
Geraghty Dyno-Tuned Prod., Inc. v. Clayton Mfg. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 508 (T.T.A.B. 1976) (state
vehicle code); see infra notes 338–339 and accompanying text (discussing PTO’s struggles to limit
application of requirement to violations of federal law).
17. To estimate the number of marks refused registration on lawful use grounds, I searched
the TM TKO database of Office Actions. See TM TKO, tmtko.com/searches (last visited Sept. 15,
2020) [https://perma.cc/8WDQ-ZZEG]. The full search query: (status_class [any]: abandoned AND
status_date [greater]: 01/01/2010) AND (content_combined [phrase]: “lawful use” AND
content_combined [not_any]: supplemental concurrent AND content_combined [not_phrase]:
“common law use”). The search returned 5,928 results since January 1, 2010. The search dates
were restricted because records of older PTO decisions are incomplete. Office Action Lawful Use
Dataset (on file with author). For an explanation of PTO registration proceedings, see infra notes
65–67 and accompanying text.
18. Barton Beebe, Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp?, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 751, 753
(2011); see also infra Section I.A (explaining benefits of registration).
19. E.g., CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
dietary supplement manufacturer did not infringe on competitor’s trademark because competitor’s
prior use of the mark had been unlawful); see also infra Section I.C.2 (discussing rise of the
unlawful use defense).
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The lawful use requirement is particularly disruptive in newly
emerging industries, where firms are testing the boundaries of the law.
Consider the state-licensed cannabis industry. More than thirty states
have legalized cannabis for medical and even recreational purposes.
These states have licensed thousands of firms to meet consumer
demand for the drug. 20 The combined sales of the industry totaled more
than $13 billion in 2019 and are projected to surpass $35 billion by
2025. 21 Entrepreneurs in this industry have already established loyal
brand followings among the nation’s more than fifty million cannabis
consumers. 22 But not one of those entrepreneurs can register its mark
with the PTO, because the sale of marijuana remains illegal under
federal law. 23
Notwithstanding its longevity and the frequency with which it
has been applied, the lawful use requirement has escaped close judicial
scrutiny. Shockingly, to date, the courts have never had to opine on the
PTO’s authority to demand lawful use for registration. 24 Most mark
owners who have been refused registration on lawful use grounds have
declined to appeal the PTO’s decision to the courts. In the rare appeals
that have been made, courts have been able to sidestep questions about
the Agency’s statutory authority by deciding the appeals on other
grounds. Left unchallenged for decades, the requirement became a
fixture in PTO registration proceedings. It was at this point that a
handful of courts began to recognize a separate defense to trademark
infringement based, in large part, on the Agency’s requirement. 25 But
in following the PTO’s lead, these courts never examined the Agency’s
justifications for making trademark registration conditional upon
compliance with nontrademark laws, nor its authority for so doing.

20. Colorado alone has licensed more than one thousand firms to cultivate, process, and/or
distribute medical or recreational marijuana. See MED Resources and Statistics, COLO. DEP’T OF
REVENUE,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/med-resources-and-statistics
(last
updated Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5K9W-26E8].
21. Chris Hudock, U.S. Legal Cannabis Market Growth, NEW FRONTIER DATA (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://newfrontierdata.com/cannabis-insights/u-s-legal-cannabis-market-growth/
[https://perma.cc/E8GP-7SRC]; see also ARCVIEW MARKET RSCH. & BDSA, THE STATE OF LEGAL
CANNABIS MARKETS 12 (8th ed. 2020) (estimating industry sales of $12.4 billion in 2019).
22. Some notable brand names in the industry include Willie’s Reserve, PharmaCann,
Marley Natural, Caviar Gold, Kiva Confections, and Grassroots.
23. See sources cited infra note 280 (listing cases where marks were rejected due to use on
marijuana products).
24. See infra Section I.C.1 (discussing judicial review of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) lawful use decisions).
25. See infra Section I.C.2 (discussing “unlawful use” defense in trademark infringement
litigation).

166

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1:161

This Article subjects the lawful use requirement to long-overdue
scrutiny. 26 It suggests that in requiring compliance with other laws for
registration, the PTO has lost sight of the one statute it is supposed to
administer. In the process, the Agency has overstepped the limits on its
statutory authority and undermined federal trademark policy. Whether
a mark owner has used its mark to sell improperly labeled shampoo or
a Schedule I controlled substance, the PTO has no mandate, and no
convincing policy reason, to refuse registration of the mark.
The Article illuminates two distinct flaws in the lawful use
requirement. First, it explains that the Lanham Act does not authorize
the PTO to condition registration upon compliance with other,
nontrademark statutes. 27 Although the Act does require mark owners
to use their marks in commerce, it specifies that this “use in commerce”
requirement is satisfied by the sale of a good bearing one’s mark,
without regard to the legality of such sale. 28 Furthermore, demanding
compliance with other laws bears no relationship to the twin purposes
behind requiring “use in commerce.” Congress required “use” of a mark
to ensure that consumers will associate the mark with goods made by a
particular vendor, and it required such use to be “in commerce” to
ensure that Congress had constitutional authority to regulate the use
of the mark. Neither of these functions hinges on or is even advanced
by a mark owner’s compliance with other laws governing the sale of
goods.
Apart from disregarding the plain language and purposes of the
“use in commerce” requirement, the PTO has ignored another provision
of the Lanham Act that specifies the exclusive grounds upon which the
Agency may refuse registration of a mark. 29 This provision would have
been the natural place for Congress to have prohibited registration of
marks used in unlawful commerce, but Congress did no such thing—a
26. It builds upon previous scholarship discussing facets of the lawful use requirement and
related doctrines. See generally James B. Astrachan, Unlawful Use in Commerce and the
Affirmative Defense to Infringement: When Trademark Rights Are Not What They Appear to Be, 69
SYRACUSE L. REV. 263 (2019) (exploring lawful use as a requirement of registration and as an
affirmative defense); Note, The Besmirched Plaintiff and the Confused Public: Unclean Hands in
Trademark Infringement, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1965) (explaining the doctrine of “unclean
hands” in trademark law and its effect on the public); Iver P. Cooper, Unclean Hands and Unlawful
Use, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 38 (1981) (explaining the switch from the “unclean hands” doctrine to
“lawful use” doctrine and its impact on trademark law); Christopher R. McElwain, High Stakes:
Marijuana Brands and the USPTO’s “[Lawful] Use” Registration Criterion (2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://pdf4pro.com/cdn/christopher-r-mcelwain-37a6.pdf [https://perma.cc/474LYPYC] (discussing the lawful use doctrine’s impact on marijuana products); Bethany Rabe,
Adapting the U.S.P.T.O.’s Unlawful Use Doctrine for the Federal Courts, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 286 (2017) (examining the unlawful use doctrine as applied in federal courts).
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. See infra Section II.B.
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conspicuous omission, given that Congress had expressly barred
protection of marks “used in unlawful businesses” in every trademark
statute it had adopted before the Lanham Act. 30
Tellingly, the PTO has seldom discussed statutory text in its
lawful use decisions. Indeed, the Agency’s first textual defense of the
requirement appeared in a decision issued more than thirty years after
the Agency began demanding lawful use for registration. In a brief
passage in that decision, a member of the Agency’s Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) suggested that, because Congress had
expressly referred to “lawful use” elsewhere in the Lanham Act, it
necessarily must have intended to demand lawful use for registration
as well. 31 But the PTO’s reasoning is just plain wrong. It not only
contravenes the usual canons of statutory interpretation, but it also
misconstrues what Congress meant by “lawful use” elsewhere in the
statute (hint: it has nothing to do with obeying other laws). 32
Lacking any textual support for its requirement, the PTO has
instead suggested that lawful use is dictated by a supposedly wellestablished principle of the common law. In its very first and most
influential lawful use decision, for example, the PTO baldly asserted
that one could never acquire property rights through wrongful acts—a
view the Agency has embraced in various guises ever since. 33 But as
every 1L property student should recognize, one may acquire valid
property rights from wrongful acts, even unlawful ones. 34 In fact, the
PTO itself confers valuable property rights in an analogous
circumstance: it issues patents on inventions that are plainly
unlawful. 35 In any event, Congress did not authorize the PTO to
supplement the Lanham Act’s express requirements for registration
with principles drawn from the common law, whether real or imagined.
Put simply, the plain text, purposes, and history of the Lanham
Act all suggest the same conclusion: Congress did not want the PTO to
consider compliance with other statutes when administering the
Lanham Act’s registration system. The lawful use requirement is,
ironically, unauthorized.

30. See infra Section II.B.
31. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 964 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1981). The case is
discussed infra Sections I.B.2. and III.A.
32. See infra Section II.A (discussing the statutory “use in commerce” requirement).
33. Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 413, 416 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1957). The
case is discussed infra in Parts I.B.2. and II.C.1.
34. See infra Section II.C.1.
35. See infra notes 218–226 and accompanying text (providing examples).
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Second, the Article also explains why the lawful use requirement
is a counterproductive and costly addendum to federal trademark
policy. 36 Perhaps most importantly, it shows that the requirement
undermines the two overarching purposes of the Lanham Act:
protecting consumers from deception and protecting firms from the
misappropriation of their brand names. 37 By making it more difficult
for firms to protect their marks from infringement, the lawful use
requirement enables rivals to engage in predatory practices that not
only rob mark owners of the goodwill they have imbued in their marks,
but also deceive consumers. For example, because of the requirement,
nothing currently prevents a cannabis firm in one state from stealing
the brand name of an out-of-state rival and using that name to hawk
its own cannabis products. As a result, consumers may not realize that
the cannabis they see in stores in different states is not necessarily the
same, even if it bears an identical mark.
Even when registration is not refused or cancelled, the lawful
use requirement still imposes substantial costs on the trademark
system. For one thing, it forces trademark attorneys to address
complicated compliance questions (like those noted above) beyond their
expertise, all to convince the PTO that a mark owner did not violate a
statute the Agency is not authorized to enforce in the first place. 38
Although the PTO has belatedly acknowledged some of the burden its
requirement inflicts on the trademark system, its attempts to lessen
that burden—namely, by grafting various exceptions to the
requirement 39—may have done more harm than good. The Article
highlights numerous inconsistencies in the PTO’s application of the
lawful use requirement, and it traces the arbitrariness to the Agency’s
failure to clearly define those exceptions. 40
Beyond the costs it imposes on the trademark system, the lawful
use requirement also exacts a toll on the administration of
nontrademark laws. 41 The PTO has taken upon itself to investigate,
adjudicate, and sanction—by refusing registration—violations of
statutes, even when the agencies responsible for enforcing those
statutes choose not to pursue the violations. By disregarding the choices
made by these other agencies, the PTO threatens to undermine the
goals of the statutes they (and not the PTO) have been trusted to
administer.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part III (arguing that trademark law should not require lawful use).
See infra Section III.A-B.
See infra Section III.C.
Those exceptions and their origins are discussed in Section I.B.2, infra.
See infra Section III.D.
See infra Section III.E.
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Highlighting the costs of the lawful use requirement helps to
explain why Congress would not have wanted the PTO to police
compliance with other statutes in the first instance. In other words, it
bolsters the claim that the requirement is unauthorized. But
highlighting these costs also explains why the PTO should eschew the
requirement now, even if the Agency remains convinced of its authority
to impose it. Simply put, the requirement is unwise.
The Article’s critique of the lawful use requirement comes at an
opportune time. The conventional wisdom of what is challengeable in
trademark law, and what is not, was, until recently, well settled. But in
the past few years, the Supreme Court has invalidated a handful of
long-standing federal trademark doctrines, including the Lanham Act’s
express prohibitions on registering disparaging, immoral, and
scandalous marks. 42 These holdings suggest the Court may be receptive
to challenges to other long-standing registration doctrines as well. 43
The Article also contributes to an emerging body of scholarship
analyzing the registration system and its broader role in federal
trademark policy. These are topics that, until recently, had been
neglected in the academy. 44 By elucidating how the PTO’s lawful use
requirement made its way into trademark infringement litigation, for
example, the Article advances our understanding of the relationship
between trademark registration and trademark protection. 45
Furthermore, by offering a new way to simplify registration
proceedings, the Article helps address the widely held concern that our
registration system, and the Agency that administers it, are
overwhelmed. 46 While it is no panacea, eliminating the distraction that
is the lawful use requirement should help focus the PTO’s limited
resources on the core concerns of trademark law. 47

42. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (holding that ban on registration of
immoral or scandalous marks violates the First Amendment); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765
(2017) (reaching same conclusion for ban on disparaging marks).
43. To be clear, the Article argues that the lawful use requirement is unauthorized and
unwise, and not that it is unconstitutional, as some have claimed. See, e.g., Robert L. Greenberg,
Cannabis Trademarks and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 525, 557 (2020) (suggesting
refusal to register trademarks used on cannabis products “is a violation of the First Amendment”).
44. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 870 (“Foundational critiques of modern trademark law tend
not to address the role of registration.”); id. at 871 (noting that “[r]egistration offers some of the
most challenging puzzles in trademark”).
45. For example, previous scholarship on lawful use has lumped together the lawful use
requirement for registration and the unlawful use defense to trademark infringement, neglecting
the separate statutory basis for each doctrine and the sequencing of their development. See, e.g.,
Astrachan, supra note 26; Cooper, supra note 26.
46. See infra notes 325–326 and accompanying text.
47. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 886 (suggesting that the registration system devotes too
much attention to matters that “don’t go to core trademark policy”).
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Beyond trademark law, the Article paints a cautionary tale
about administrative agencies and the evolution of their missions. 48
Delving into the previously uncharted early history of the PTO’s lawful
use requirement, the Article shows that the Agency did not always
demand compliance with other laws for registration. 49 Indeed,
immediately after passage of the Lanham Act, the PTO required
compliance with just two specific federal statutes, each limiting the
brand names firms could use on meat and alcohol products. Given that
those limitations were nearly identical to ones imposed by the Lanham
Act, the lawful use requirement may have been originally conceived as
a way for the PTO to coordinate “shared regulatory space” with other
federal agencies enforcing identical statutory requirements. 50 Over
time, however, the PTO lost sight of that function, as it began to
demand compliance with an ever-expanding array of statutes unrelated
to the Lanham Act or the concerns of trademark law. The Article also
identifies factors, such as the lack of judicial review of key Agency
decisions, that enabled the PTO to enlarge its mission, and to lose sight
of the statute it was supposed to administer.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on
the origin and evolution of the lawful use requirement, including
previously overlooked details concerning the original version of the
requirement and the lack of judicial review of Agency lawful use
decisions over the years. Part II also catalogs each of the arguments the
PTO has made to justify the lawful use requirement. Parts III–IV then
scrutinize these arguments to demonstrate why they cannot sustain the
lawful use requirement, either as an interpretation of the Lanham Act
as written, or as a desirable addition to federal trademark policy. Part
V concludes and briefly outlines how the PTO and the courts could
eliminate the lawful use requirement and thereby refocus the Agency’s
attention on the Lanham Act, the lone statute the Agency should worry
about when administering federal trademark law.

48. For a sampling of scholarship examining the evolution of agency missions and
jurisdiction, see, for example, Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2005); Cass
R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies As Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J.
1013 (1998); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement
of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001); and JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
49. See infra Section I.B.1.a.
50. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE LAWFUL USE REQUIREMENT
This Part provides the most exhaustive examination to date of
the origins and evolution of the lawful use requirement, including
previously overlooked details about the earliest version of the
requirement. This history lays the foundation for the claims developed
below that the lawful use requirement is neither a reasonable
interpretation of Lanham Act Congress passed, nor a sound addition to
federal trademark policy.
Section A begins with a brief review of the federal trademark
registration system and the requirements set forth by the Lanham Act
for registering a mark with the PTO. It notes that while the statute does
require use of a mark in commerce to seek registration, the Lanham Act
does not expressly require that such use be lawful, in the sense of in
compliance with other statutes.
Section B then explains how the PTO introduced the lawful use
requirement into the registration system, first through the
promulgation of rules, and then through decisions issued by the TTAB
in registration proceedings. In discussing the Agency’s decisions,
Section B identifies and catalogs each of the rationales the PTO has
given for interpreting “use in commerce” as “lawful use in commerce.”
Section B also discusses how the Agency has grafted various limitations
onto the requirement, in response to its own (belated) misgivings about
the requirement.
Finally, Section C highlights the subdued role the courts have
played in the development of the lawful use requirement. It notes that,
notwithstanding the theoretical availability of judicial review of PTO
lawful use decisions, that option has seldom been exercised. In fact,
courts have never had to gauge whether the PTO has the authority to
impose the lawful use requirement for registration. Section C also
illuminates for the first time the relationship between the PTO’s lawful
use requirement and the unlawful use defense that some courts have
recently adopted in trademark infringement proceedings. It suggests
that these courts have reflexively extended the reach of the PTO’s
lawful use requirement, without bothering to closely scrutinize the
statutory basis for the requirement or the possible rationales behind it.
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A. The Lanham Act’s Requirements for Registration
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946 to replace and update
a patchwork of trademark laws enacted between 1881 and 1925. 51 The
Lanham Act now serves as the “foundation of current federal trademark
law.” 52 It creates a comprehensive and elaborate scheme for federal
trademark protection, including the registration of marks.
Registration is not mandatory, but the Lanham Act “confers
significant, substantive advantages on the registered mark,” 53
especially those marks included on the principal register. Among other
things, inclusion on that register constitutes “prima facie evidence of
the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark,
of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right
to use the registered mark in commerce” nationwide; 54 it serves as
“constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership” of the
mark; 55 it makes the mark “incontestable” following five years of
continuous use post registration; 56 and it enables the mark owner to
recover additional damages and attorneys’ fees for infringement. 57
The Lanham Act also specifies the requirements applicants
must satisfy to register their marks on the principal register. 58 In
particular, section 1 of the Act stipulates that applicants seeking
registration of a mark need only provide:
• “specimens or facsimiles of the mark,” as well as a “drawing of
the mark”
• “specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship”

51. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141n). Statutes passed in 1867, 1870, 1881, 1905, 1920, and 1925 established a system for
registration of trademarks with the Patent Office (as it was then known), and these statutes
provided some limited protections for marks. However, dissatisfaction with these earlier
trademark laws prompted Congress to overhaul the federal trademark system in 1946. See Ethan
Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59 (1996) (discussing history of Lanham Act and
preceding federal trademark laws).
52. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017).
53. Beebe, supra note 18, at 753; see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:90 (5th ed. 2021) (listing seven procedural and legal advantages to
registration).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
55. Id. § 1072.
56. Id. § 1065 (also noting exceptions).
57. Id. § 1117.
58. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 955 (2018)
(summarizing requirements). The Lanham Act also expressly enumerates the permissible grounds
for refusing registration of a mark that otherwise meets the requirements for registration. Those
grounds for refusal are discussed in detail infra Section II.B.
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a description of “the goods in connection with which the mark is
used”
• a verified statement that the applicant is “the owner of the
mark”
• a verified statement that “no other person has the right to use
such mark in commerce either in the identical form thereof or in
such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or
in connection with the goods of such other person, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” and
• a declaration that the mark “is in use in commerce,” as well as
specification of the “date of the applicant’s first use of the mark
in commerce” 59
This list of the requirements for registration has remained largely
unchanged since the Lanham Act was adopted in 1946. 60
Only the last of these requirements—that the mark is “in use in
commerce”—is relevant for present purposes. Section 45 of the Lanham
Act expressly defines the meaning of this phrase. It declares that a
mark is “in use in commerce” when it “is placed in any manner
on . . . goods or their containers” and those goods are then “sold or
transported in commerce.” 61 Importantly, section 45 also clarifies that
the term “commerce” encompasses “all commerce which may lawfully
be regulated by Congress.” 62 As discussed more below, Congress
included this language to ensure the Lanham Act fell within the
authority conferred by the Commerce Clause. 63
Thus, according to the plain text of the Lanham Act, “use in
commerce” simply means the sale or transportation of a good bearing
one’s mark, as long as the sale or transportation meets the
constitutional definition of “Commerce with foreign Nations, [or] among
the several States, [or] with the Indian Tribes.” 64 Notably absent from
the text of the Lanham Act is the suggestion that the sale or
•

59. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)-(d).
60. In 1988, Congress amended the statute to allow registration based on a “bona fide
intention . . . to use a trademark in commerce,” rather than just actual use in commerce.
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 103, § 1(1)(b), 102 Stat. 3935, 3935
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)). Accordingly, Congress also amended the definition
of “use in commerce” to include “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and
not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” Id. § 134(8) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127) (emphasis added). According to the PTO, these changes were made primarily “to eliminate
the practice of ‘token use,’ or use made solely to reserve rights in a mark.” U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 901.02 (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter TMEP]
(discussing statutory amendment and its legislative history).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying text.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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transportation of goods must comport with other laws. In other words,
the statute does not literally refer to “lawful use in commerce,” or
alternatively, “use in lawful commerce.” Nonetheless, as discussed next,
the PTO has imposed just such a condition on registration.
B. The PTO’s Lawful Use Requirement
The PTO plays a limited but important role in federal trademark
law. Most importantly, for our purposes, the Agency administers the
Lanham Act’s invaluable registration system. 65 The Agency’s
trademark examiners review registration applications to determine
whether applicants have satisfied the requirements specified by section
1 (detailed above), and whether their marks run afoul of any of the
prohibitions specified by section 2 (discussed below). If the examiner
approves the application, the PTO will publish the mark in the Agency’s
Official Gazette, giving other parties notice of the mark’s pending
registration. If the examiner instead refuses registration, a decision
called an “Office Action,” the applicant may appeal to the TTAB, which
is an administrative tribunal comprised of senior PTO officials and a
pool of administrative trademark judges. 66 In addition to hearing these
appeals from ex parte Office Actions, the TTAB also presides over inter
partes registration disputes, including opposition proceedings, in which
a party challenges the pending registration of a mark, and cancellation
proceedings, in which a party asks the TTAB to cancel an existing
registration. 67 The decisions of the TTAB in all of these matters are
subject to judicial review, as discussed below.
In these registration proceedings, and in rules promulgated to
govern them, the PTO has insisted that section 1’s “use in commerce”
requirement is satisfied only by the lawful use of a mark. In other
words, the Agency has refused or cancelled registration when the sale
of a good bearing the mark violates any federal (and possibly even state)
law. This condition on registration is commonly known as the “lawful
use requirement.” 68

65. For an overview of the PTO’s role in administering the trademark registration system,
see Melissa F. Wasserman, What Administrative Law Can Teach the Trademark System, 93 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1511, 1523–26 (2016).
66. The TTAB typically decides cases using a three-Member panel drawn from this pool. U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 102.03
(June 2020) [hereinafter TBMP].
67. Id. § 102.02.
68. It would be more accurate to call it the “use in lawful commerce requirement,” since
“lawful” modifies “commerce,” rather than “use.” But to avoid confusion, the Article will employ
the PTO’s preferred name.
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This Section discusses the origins and evolution of the PTO’s
lawful use requirement. It exhaustively catalogs the arguments the
PTO has made for conditioning registration on compliance with
nontrademark laws, as well as the concerns that have prompted the
Agency to impose some limits on this requirement.
1. PTO Rules
a. Forgotten Rule 100.141
The lawful use requirement first appeared in a formal rule
promulgated by the PTO in 1947, soon after Congress passed the
Lanham Act. 69 Rule 100.141 was tucked in among a comprehensive set
of rules promulgated by the Agency to govern trademark proceedings.
In its entirety, Rule 100.141 stated:
100.141 Federal label approval required in certain cases. Whenever an application is filed
for the registration of a trade-mark which is either a part of or associated with a label for
a product which, under the provisions of an act of Congress, cannot be lawfully sold in the
commerce specified in the written applications without prior approval of the label by a
designated Government agency, a copy of such label and its certification must be made of
record in the application . . . .
Types of labels for which prior approval must be secured . . . :
Labels for meat products (Class 46) which are subject to Federal inspection, must be
approved by the Meat Inspection Division, Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of
Agriculture.
Labels for wines (Class 47) and for distilled alcoholic liquors (Class 49) must be approved
by the Federal Alcohol Administration. 70

As is evident, Rule 100.141 was far narrower than the lawful use
requirement the PTO imposes today. It applied only to marks used on
the labels of three types of products: meat, wine, and distilled liquors.
Two statutes passed before the Lanham Act—the 1906 Meat Inspection
Act (“MIA”) and the 1935 Alcohol Administration Act (“AAA”)—
required labels for those products to be approved by the United States
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the Federal Alcohol
Administration, respectively, before they could be sold. 71 Rule 100.141
made compliance with the label approval requirements of those two
statutes—but no other laws—a condition for registration.
The limit imposed by Rule 100.141 was even more modest than
at first glance appears, because the labeling restrictions imposed by the
69. 12 Fed. Reg. 3958, 3962 (June 19, 1947) (originally codified at 37 C.F.R. § 100.141).
70. Id.
71. Meat Inspection Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-382, 34 Stat. 669, 669; Alcohol Administration
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-401. § 5(e), 49 Stat. 977, 982–84.
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AAA and MIA were nearly identical to restrictions imposed by the
Lanham Act. The AAA, for example, barred using
a trade or brand name that is the name of any living individual of public prominence . . . if
the use of the such name . . . is likely falsely to lead the consumer to believe that the
product has been indorsed, made, or used by, or produced for, or under the supervision
of . . . such individual. 72

The AAA also barred use of “disparaging . . . false, misleading, obscene,
or indecent” brand names. 73 Similarly, the MIA stipulated that “no
meat . . . shall be sold or offered for sale . . . under any false or deceptive
name.” 74 Importantly, section 2 of the Lanham Act includes nearly
identical restrictions on marks that may be registered by the PTO.
Namely, it also bars registration of marks that are deceptive,
misleading, scandalous, or obscene, as well as marks that resemble the
names of famous persons. 75 In effect, then, Rule 100.141 may not have
added any new requirement at all for registration, even for purveyors
of meat, wine, or distilled spirits.
The narrowness of this original incarnation of the lawful use
requirement is enlightening. The leadership of the PTO circa 1947 was
no doubt intimately familiar with the Lanham Act. Had it believed
Congress wanted to make compliance with all laws a condition for
registration of a mark (as it now insists), the Agency could easily have
promulgated a rule to that effect. The fact that the PTO refrained from
doing so suggests the Agency doubted the Lanham Act demanded so
much of applicants.
There is no legislative history for Rule 100.141, so it remains a
bit of a puzzle why the Agency required compliance even with the two
specifically enumerated federal labeling statutes. However, Rule
100.141 may have been promulgated to coordinate the PTO’s “shared
regulatory space” with two other federal agencies (the USDA and the
Federal Alcohol Administration) that were tasked with administering
nearly identical restrictions on product names. 76 Put another way, Rule
100.141 may have simply clarified that the PTO would defer to
determinations made by those other two agencies regarding whether,
for example, the brand name used by a party seeking registration was
72. § 5(e)(5), 49 Stat. at 983–84.
73. § 5(e)(4), 49 Stat. at 983.
74. 34 Stat. at 676. To be sure, the MIA and AAA included a few additional requirements not
found in the Lanham Act, such as mandating that labels on wine and distilled liquors indicate
alcohol content. § 5(e)(2), 49 Stat. at 982.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (c); see infra Section II.B for a discussion of section 2.
76. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2012) (exhaustively reviewing methods of interagency
coordination). The PTO’s choice to defer to determinations made by those other agencies would
constitute “discretionary consultation.” Id. at 1157.
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deceptive or misleading. 77 Viewed this way, the Rule would prevent
federal agencies from reaching different conclusions about the propriety
of using a given brand name qua mark.
Unfortunately, the PTO (and commentators) have completely
forgotten Rule 100.141 and thus overlooked the lessons it holds for
debates over the lawful use requirement. 78
b. Rule 2.69
With only one minor revision (to add lard 79), Rule 100.141 stayed
in effect until 1955, at which point the PTO replaced Rule 100.141 with
a much broader rule, renumbered as Rule 2.69. The new Rule provided:
When the sale or transportation of any product for which registration of a trademark is
sought is regulated under an Act of Congress, the [Patent and Trademark] Office
may . . . make appropriate inquiry as to compliance with such Act for the sole purpose of
determining lawfulness of the commerce recited in the application. 80

Rule 2.69 remains in effect to this day and is the only PTO rule
concerning the lawful use requirement. 81
Rule 2.69 greatly expanded the scope of the lawful use
requirement. On its face, Rule 2.69 demands compliance with far more
than the two specific federal labeling laws that had been referenced by
its predecessor. 82 It demands compliance with all federal laws. Rule
2.69 thus opened the door for PTO investigations into compliance with
a staggering array of federal statutes in trademark registration
proceedings. 83

77. Viewed this way, Rule 100.141 could be considered a procedural rule, an important
distinction since the Agency lacks authority to promulgate substantive rules. See infra Section
II.D.
78. The TTAB has never mentioned Rule 100.141 in a decision, and the PTO has ignored the
Rule when recounting the history of its lawful use requirement. See, e.g., Brief and Supplemental
Appendix for Appellee, In re JJ206, LLC, 2017 WL 4077635, at *2–7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 2017) (No.
2017-1350). Likewise, previous scholarship on the lawful use requirement has paid scant attention
to Rule 100.141.
79. 14 Fed. Reg. 6639, 6640 (Nov. 1, 1949) (originally codified at 37 C.F.R. § 100.141)
(inserting “including lard” after “meat products” in Rule 100.141).
80. 20 Fed. Reg. 4797, 4803 (July 7, 1955) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 ) (emphasis
added).
81. In 1989, the PTO made minor cosmetic changes to the rule to conform to the Trademark
Law Revisions Act of 1988. 54 Fed. Reg. 37588, 37592 (Sept. 11, 1989) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 2.69).
The Act is discussed supra note 60.
82. Although Rule 2.69 literally only authorizes examiners to make inquiries, the TTAB
acknowledges that it also authorizes examiners to refuse registration based on their findings,
because otherwise those inquiries “would be nothing more than a waste of time and effort.” In re
Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48, 51 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
83. For a sampling of statutes that have formed the basis for lawful use claims, see supra
notes 4–16 and accompanying text.
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Again, there is no legislative history to explain why the PTO
adopted this Rule and why it tossed aside the far more limited Rule
100.141. However, the dramatic expansion in the scope of the Agency’s
lawful use requirement serves as an early indication that the PTO was
losing sight of the statute it was supposed to administer and the
concerns, like consumer confusion, the Lanham Act was enacted to
address.
2. TTAB Decisions in Registration Proceedings
Following the promulgation of Rule 2.69, the PTO has made
compliance with nontrademark laws a condition for satisfying the “use
in commerce” requirement in trademark registration proceedings.
Indeed, the lawful use requirement has been raised in more than
seventy TTAB decisions since 1957, along with thousands more Office
Actions that were never appealed to the TTAB. 84
Unlike the Agency’s Rules, the TTAB’s opinions in these
registration proceedings help explain why the PTO insists upon “lawful
use” for registration. 85 The opinions also reveal, however, that the
Agency has harbored some doubts about the legality and wisdom of
policing compliance with an ever-expanding array of nontrademark
laws—doubts which have prompted the Agency to attempt to rein in its
requirement.
The PTO first applied the lawful use requirement in a
cancellation proceeding in 1957. Coahoma Chemical Co. v. Smith
stemmed from a dispute between two parties that sold insecticides
using nearly identical marks. 86 In 1950, the PTO denied Coahoma
Chemical’s application to register the RED PANTHER mark because
the mark was too similar to another one (BLACK PANTHER) that had
previously been registered by Smith. But a few years later, after
discovering that the labels Smith had used on its BLACK PANTHER
insecticides did not fully comply with the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 87 Coahoma petitioned the
84. See TTAB Lawful Use Decisions Dataset (on file with author) (identifying seventy-six
TTAB decisions discussing the lawful use requirement between 1957–2020); Office Action Lawful
Use Dataset, supra note 17.
85. While the agency has mentioned the lawful use requirement in numerous decisions, it
has discussed the basis for the requirement in only a handful of them. In most cases, the agency
simply takes for granted that the Lanham Act requires lawful use. See, e.g, In re Silenus Wines,
Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 533, 535 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (remarking that “[i]t is well settled that no
trademark rights can be acquired through unlawful use in commerce”).
86. 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 413 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1957).
87. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 124, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y). Among other things, the Act required labels on “economic
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PTO to cancel Smith’s BLACK PANTHER mark. In its petition,
Coahoma claimed that “use in commerce” meant lawful use in
commerce, and that, because Smith’s products had been mislabeled, its
prior sales of BLACK PANTHER insecticide could not serve as the basis
for the registration of Smith’s mark. 88
Serving in the role now played by the TTAB, the Assistant
Commissioner of Patents (“ACP”) agreed with Coahoma. 89 The ACP
cancelled Smith’s BLACK PANTHER mark on three grounds, including
the claim that Smith’s sales of mislabeled insecticides could not satisfy
the Lanham Act’s use in commerce requirement. 90
In concluding that “use in commerce” means use that did not
violate other laws (here, FIFRA), the ACP did not bother to consider the
Lanham Act’s text, legislative history, or the statute’s purposes.
Instead, the ACP simply claimed that general principles of property law
made it “obvious” that a party could never gain property rights (like
ownership of a mark) through unlawful acts, like the sale of mislabeled
insecticides. In the terse passage of the opinion on point, the ACP wrote:
May property rights be acquired as a result of unlawful acts? The obvious answer to the
question in its simplified form is in the negative. No decision in a trademark case has
been found which is directly in point; but in other fields of the law which might reasonably
be analogous, i.e. real property and personal property, where claimed ownership was
based on acquisition by unlawful means, the principle is so well-established that citation
of authorities is unnecessary . . . . [U]se of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments
in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the Patent Office may
recognize. 91

It is difficult to overstate the influence of the ACP’s opinion in
Coahoma, which is commonly described as the “leading case” on the
PTO’s lawful use requirement. 92 But Coahoma was just the first in a
long line of registration proceedings in which the PTO has applied the
lawful use requirement.
The TTAB issued its next notable decision in 1968, in an appeal
from an Office Action. The trademark examiner in In re Stellar
International, Inc. had refused to register applicant’s JETFRESH
mark, because the examiner believed applicant’s sales of breath
fresheners violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). 93 In
poisons” to include the name and address of the manufacturer, its weight, and various warning
labels. § 3, 61 Stat. at 166–167.
88. Coahoma, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 416.
89. See MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 20:99 (explaining trademark procedures in place before
the creation of the TTAB in 1958).
90. Coahoma, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 417. As discussed infra Section C.1, the court of appeals
relied upon one of these alternate grounds to uphold the ACP’s cancellation on Smith’s mark.
91. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
92. MALLA POLLACK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW § 2:8 (2020).
93. 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
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particular, the examiner thought applicant should have indicated the
weight of each package on its product labels, specimens of which had
been submitted with its registration application.
On appeal to the TTAB, the applicant argued that the PTO
lacked authority under the Lanham Act to refuse registration based on
violations of the FDCA, or any other nontrademark law. Stressing the
literal language of the trademark statute, the applicant reasoned that
“since the mark was used on goods sold in commerce which may be
lawfully regulated by Congress, the refusal of registration is not only
improper but is not contemplated” by the Lanham Act. 94 In other words,
the applicant claimed that because its sales of JETFRESH breath
freshener met the express statutory definition of “use in commerce,” the
PTO had no business refusing registration of its mark.
Although it offhandedly acknowledged “there is no reference to
‘lawful commerce’ in Section 1 of the trademark statute,” 95 the TTAB
nonetheless reaffirmed Coahoma’s holding that only lawful sales satisfy
the “use in commerce” requirement for registration. In the opinion for
the panel, written by Member Lefkowitz, the author of several TTAB
lawful use decisions, the TTAB reasoned:
It seems evident that the term “commerce” whenever and wherever used in the trademark
statute must necessarily refer to “lawful commerce”; and that the statute was not
intended to recognize under its registration provisions shipments in commerce in
contravention of other regulatory acts promulgated under the “commerce clause” of the
Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to place the Patent Office in the anomalous
position of accepting as a basis for registration a shipment in commerce which is unlawful
under a statute specifically controlling the flow of such goods in commerce. 96

Put another way, the TTAB suggested that it would be strange for
Congress to confer valuable intellectual property rights under the
Lanham Act when the sales that created those rights violated one of its
other statutes. To avoid this apparent anomaly, so the argument goes,
the statute’s “use in commerce” requirement must be interpreted to
imply “[lawful] use in commerce,” or perhaps more accurately, “use in
[lawful] commerce.”
Even though it insisted unlawful commerce could not serve as
the basis for registration, the TTAB suggested, for the first time, that
it should impose some limits on this principle. Recognizing that the
PTO was not “properly equipped” to “police all the different regulatory
statutes to ensure compliance therewith,” 97 the Board recommended,
rather vaguely, that trademark examiners should exercise their
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 50 (paraphrasing appellant’s argument).
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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investigative authority under Rule 2.69 “sparingly and only when the
file suggests noncompliance with a regulatory act.” 98 More specifically,
the Board suggested that
if specimen labels submitted with an application show on their face that the applicant has
not complied with the labeling provisions of a regulatory statute governing the shipment
in commerce of goods bearing such labels, a question may be raised under Rule 2.69 to
ascertain whether or not the applicant had complied with the applicable statute. 99

(It is worth noting that while many of the TTAB’s early lawful use
cases—including Coahoma and In re Stellar—did involve labeling
defects, the PTO has since applied its lawful use requirement to a broad
array of legal violations not involving labeling. 100)
More than a decade after Stellar, the TTAB would engage in the
Agency’s most extensive and divisive discussion of the lawful use
requirement. Satinine v. P.A.B. 101 involved a complicated and
protracted inter partes dispute over the PAB mark on cosmetics. Suffice
to say that one party invoked the lawful use requirement in a petition
to cancel the other party’s registration of the mark. 102 Although all
three members of the panel agreed that the registrant had not in fact
violated any law (they dismissed the petition on that ground), 103 each
panelist wrote separately to raise or respond to concerns about the
lawful use requirement.
Most interestingly, one member of the panel expressed serious
doubts about the legitimacy of the requirement. Member Rice
acknowledged that “[a] very persuasive argument can be made for the
proposition that there is in fact no statutory basis for refusing to grant
a registration, or for cancelling a subsisting registration, on the ground
of ‘unlawful use.’ ” 104 The Member observed that in Coahoma, which
“gave birth to the practice of refusing registration on this ground, the
Assistant Commissioner did not attempt to set forth a statutory basis
for the practice, but rather resorted to an analogy with other fields of
law, namely, real property and personal property.” 105
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See sources cited supra notes 4–17 and accompanying text.
101. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
102. In particular, the petitioner claimed that registrant had abandoned its mark because it
had mislabeled its PAB branded cosmetics, in violation of the FDCA, for at least two years—the
period of non-use that constituted abandonment at the time. Id. at 960–62.
103. The panel accepted registrant’s argument that, because its cosmetics were “for
professional use,” the retail labeling requirements of the FDCA cited by the petitioner did not
apply to sales of the registrant’s products. Id. at 963.
104. Id. at 964 n.2 (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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Seeking to mollify such doubts, a second member of the Satinine
panel suggested, at last, a textual basis for the lawful use requirement.
Member Kera claimed that “lawful” use was necessarily implied by
section 1, the section governing the principal register, because another
section of the Lanham Act explicitly required “lawful use in commerce”
for inclusion on the supplemental register. 106 (The supplemental
register is the seldom-used repository of “non-marks” that do not satisfy
the requirements for inclusion on the principal register, for example,
because they are merely descriptive. 107) In particular, section 23 of the
Lanham Act states:
All marks capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods or services and not registrable on
the principal register . . . , except those declared to be unregistrable under subsections (a),
(b), (c), (d), and (e)(3) of section 1052 of this title, which are in lawful use in commerce by
the owner thereof . . . may be registered on the supplemental register . . . . 108

Member Kera reasoned that “it would be wholly contradictory to
require ‘lawful use’ for an application to register a mark upon the
supplemental register but not to require ‘lawful use’ for an application
to register a mark upon the principal register, which confers much
greater rights upon the registrant.” 109 Remarkably, this argument,
which runs fewer than one hundred words, constitutes the TTAB’s most
extensive textualist defense of the lawful use requirement.
Member Kera and the third Member of the panel (Lefkowitz)
also defended the requirement on the same grounds given by the TTAB
in Stellar (which Lefkowitz had written). Referring to that case,
Member Kera wrote, “I agree completely that it would be anomalous for
the Patent and Trademark Office to accord recognition to the use of a
mark when the use relied upon was unlawful. To cite an extreme
example, it would be unthinkable to register a mark for use on
heroin.” 110 (Put aside that HEROIN was once a trademark owned by the
Bayer Corporation. 111) In a short concurring opinion, Member
Lefkowitz remarked simply that “[i]t is recognized that trademark
rights cannot accrue from an unlawful use of a mark in commerce. See:
In re Stellar International, Inc.” 112 In passing, Member Lefkowitz also
106. Id. at 967 (Kera, Member, concurring).
107. For an illuminating account of the history of and function served by the supplemental
register, see Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, The United States Supplemental Register:
Solace, Substance, or Just Extinct?, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 828 (2013).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (emphasis added).
109. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 967.
110. Id.
111. Heroin, Granola, & More: Products that Became Words, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/top-10-words-from-trademarks-vol-1/heroin
(last visited Sept. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/86AS-QLLG].
112. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 966.
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appeared to suggest that the lawful use requirement (somehow)
protected consumers as well, as he recited the statute’s purpose of
quashing “the deceptive and misleading use of marks” immediately
before the line just quoted. 113
Even though the lawful use requirement survived Satinine with
the support of at least two-thirds of the panel, 114 the requirement did
not escape unscathed. Members Rice and Kera each proposed limits on
the requirement that would be endorsed by TTAB panels in later lawful
use decisions. Echoing concerns first aired in Stellar, Member Rice
warned that
[d]ue to a proliferation of federal regulatory acts in recent years, there is now an almost
endless number of such acts which the Board might in the future be compelled to interpret
in order to determine whether a particular use in commerce is lawful. Inasmuch as we
have little or no familiarity with most of these acts, there is a serious question as to the
advisability of our attempting to adjudicate whether a party’s use in commerce is in
compliance with the particular regulatory act or acts which may be applicable thereto. 115

Thus, to ease the Agency’s task of enforcing the requirement,
Member Rice suggested that the TTAB should apply it only when the
evidence “leave[s] no room for doubt, speculation, surmise, or
interpretation” that a mark owner’s sales were unlawful. 116 Satisfying
this test requires demonstrating either 1) that “the issue of compliance
has previously been determined (with a finding of noncompliance) by an
entity, such as a court or government agency, having competent
jurisdiction under the statute in question,” or 2) that “there has been a
per se violation of a statute regulating the sale of a party’s goods.” 117
For their part, Member Kera cautioned that the TTAB “should
not refuse registration or order the cancellation of a registration
because of some purely collateral defect such as the use of a container
which did not comply with an ICC regulation or the failure of a party to
pay an excise tax.” 118 Thus, Member Kera proposed that “[t]here must
be some nexus between the use of the mark and the alleged violation
before it can be said that the unlawfulness of the sale or shipment has
resulted in the invalidity of an application or registration.” 119
113. Id.
114. While Member Rice expressed serious misgivings about the legality and wisdom of the
lawful use requirement, the Member apparently believed the Board was bound by Federal Circuit
precedent to adhere to the requirement. As explained below, however, the Member misread that
precedent. See infra Section I.C.1 (discussing the Court of Patent Claims decision in Coahoma).
115. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 964.
116. Id at 965.
117. Id. at 964. As discussed below, the TTAB has never satisfactorily explained what
constitutes a “per se” violation of a statute warranting application of the lawful use requirement.
See infra notes 320–323 and accompanying text.
118. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 967.
119. Id.
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In General Mills v. Health Valley Foods, Inc., the TTAB panel
endorsed both proposed limits from Satinine and grafted a third
limitation onto the increasingly complicated lawful use requirement. 120
This case involved a petition to cancel General Mills’ registration of the
FIBER ONE mark for use on breakfast cereal, based on the claim that
General Mills had failed to list some of the nutritional information
required by the FDCA on its cereal boxes. Although General Mills
admitted the violation, it protested that it had quickly rectified the
error (only the first eighteen boxes out of six hundred thousand sold had
been mislabeled); that the omission was “inadvertent”; and that it
constituted, at most, a “technical violation” of the statute. 121
The TTAB agreed that “technical noncompliance should not
result in the Draconian result of cancellation of [a] registration.” 122
Instead, the Agency opined, the violation must be “material, that
is . . . of such gravity and significance that the usage must be considered
unlawful[—]so tainted that, as a matter of law, it could create no
trademark rights.” 123 Although it acknowledged that this limitation
would require the PTO “to make a case by case determination of the
importance or materiality” of every alleged violation, it suggested this
was “preferable to a blanket policy of finding every possible technical
violation” grounds for cancellation or refusal of registration, “no matter
how minor or harmless the violation may be.” 124 Such a “rigid
approach,” the Agency advised, served “the interests of neither justice
nor common sense.” 125 The TTAB thus forgave General Mills’
“immaterial” transgression of the FDCA and dismissed the petition for
cancellation of its mark.
In more recent cases, the TTAB has suggested one final limit on
the lawful use requirement, namely, that it demands compliance only
with federal law. 126 The TTAB reached that conclusion based on the text
of Rule 2.69—and notably, not the text of the Lanham Act. Because Rule
2.69 refers to sales regulated “under an Act of Congress,” the Board

120. 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1270 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
121. Id. at 1273.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1274.
124. Id. at 1275.
125. Id.
126. See W. Worldwide Enters. Grp. Inc. v. Qinqdao Brewery, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1137, 1141
(T.T.A.B. 1990) (dismissing cancellation petition based on violation of foreign law); see also
Netcloud, LLC v. E. Coast Network Servs., LLC, No. 91210559, 2015 WL 1518045, at *6–7
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2015) (sustaining opposition notwithstanding claim that opposer’s prior use
violated state law).
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reasoned, “‘unlawful’ must be held to imply only such commerce as is
unlawful under the Acts of Congress,” and not state or foreign laws. 127
C. The Courts and Lawful Use
This Section reviews federal court case law discussing the lawful
use requirement in both appeals from PTO registration proceedings and
in trademark infringement lawsuits. It also offers several reasons why
the PTO’s statutory authority to demand lawful use has escaped
judicial scrutiny for decades, and why some courts have nonetheless
extended the reach of the Agency’s requirement to infringement
litigation.
1. Judicial Review of TTAB Lawful Use Decisions
The Lanham Act gives a party “dissatisfied” by a decision of the
TTAB two options for challenging that decision in court. 128 The first
option is to appeal the Board’s decision directly to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 129 The second option is to
initiate a new civil case in federal district court, naming as the
defendant either the opposing party, or the PTO itself in appeals from
ex parte proceedings. 130 The main difference between the two options is
that a district court may consider new evidence, whereas the Federal
Circuit will decide the case based on the evidentiary record compiled by
the TTAB. 131 Both the district court and the Federal Circuit will review
the TTAB’s legal decisions, including the Board’s interpretations of the
Lanham Act, de novo, 132 and the remedy they provide is the same: the
court may order the PTO to register, cancel, or restore a mark. 133
Notwithstanding the Lanham Act’s elaborate appeal provisions,
however, parties have seldom sought judicial review of the TTAB’s
lawful use decisions. Stunningly, I found only six TTAB lawful use
127. W. Worldwide, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) at 1141.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1071.
129. Id. § 1071(a). The Federal Circuit is an Article III court with nationwide jurisdiction over
specialized subject matter, including trademarks. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
U.S.
CT.
OF
APPEALS
FOR
THE
FED.
CIR.
(June
2019),
Circuit,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/June_2019_Jurisdiction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UVB-ZYMP].
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b).
131. MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 21:21 (noting that “[t]he ability to buttress the [TTAB] record
with new evidence is the primary reason for the dissatisfied party to elect to go to a district court”).
132. Id.; see also In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that TTAB’s “interpretations of the Lanham Act and the legal tests it applies in measuring
registrability, are reviewed de novo”).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1119.
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decisions from which appeals were taken—a number representing less
than one-twelfth of all TTAB decisions discussing the requirement. 134
Even more importantly, not one of the courts hearing these appeals
ultimately addressed whether the TTAB has authority to demand
lawful use for registration, either because the parties did not question
the Agency’s authority in the first place, or because the court was able
to decide the case on other grounds and thereby sidestep the authority
challenge. 135
The appeal from the PTO’s decision in Coahoma—the very first,
and arguably most influential, Agency lawful use decision—is the most
noteworthy of these cases. Smith, the party whose registration had been
cancelled on lawful use grounds, appealed the ACP’s decision to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor to the Federal
Circuit. 136 However, the court declined to address the ACP’s lawful use
decision. 137 Instead, it opted to affirm the cancellation on other grounds
(in particular, that appellant did not own the mark). 138 In its opinion,
the court pointedly announced that because its decision on the
ownership issue was “fatal to the validity” of appellant’s registration, it
was “unnecessary to pass on the other grounds on which the decision of
the Assistant Commissioner was based”—namely, the lawful use
requirement. 139
While the court did not necessarily moot the ACP’s lawful use
decision, 140 it clearly did not endorse that decision either. Indeed,
134. The six appealed cases are Smith v. Coahoma Chem. Co., 264 F.2d 916, 920 (C.C.P.A.
1959) (cancellation affirmed on other grounds); In re Application of Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d
806, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (same); Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 841, 843–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (challenge to requirement dismissed because not timely
pleaded); Johnson & Johnson v. Jack Frost Lab’ys Inc., No. 89-1291, 1990 WL 488871, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 6, 1990) (lawful use not raised on appeal); O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65
F.3d 933, 936 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (TTAB’s “authority” to demand lawful use not challenged on
appeal); Vosk Int’l Co. v. Zao Gruppa Predpriyatij Ost, No. C11-1488, 2013 WL 5588296, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2013) (same).
135. See cases cited supra note 134.
136. Smith, 264 F.2d at 916.
137. Id. at 920.
138. Even though registrant qua appellant (Smith) was the president of the company that
manufactured and sold the insecticides, the ACP and court agreed that title did not make Smith
the user of the mark. And because the appellant had not used the mark himself, he could not claim
ownership over it. See id. at 919.
139. Id. at 920.
140. Id. This depends on whether the TTAB considers itself bound by alternative grounds for
its prior holdings. The general rule for courts of appeals is that “when one or more separate rulings
each support the court’s result, all of those rulings have precedential effect.” Adam N. Steinman,
To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1737, 1802 (2013). But see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.23 (2006) (observing that courts may feel “less clearly bound
to adhere” to alternative holdings because they may have received less careful attention). But
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notwithstanding some misguided TTAB claims to the contrary, the
Federal Circuit (and its predecessor court) has never squarely upheld
the TTAB’s authority to demand compliance with all laws for
registration—not in Smith v. Coahoma, 141 nor in any case decided
since. 142 To be sure, there are a handful of Federal Circuit decisions that
mention “lawful use” in passing, but they do so only in the context of
quoting other provisions of the Lanham Act that, for reasons explained
in Section II.A below, do not apply to the principal register.
There are several possible explanations for the paucity of
appeals taken from the TTAB’s lawful use decisions. For one thing, in
many lawful use cases, the TTAB has found the requirement was not
violated, say, because it determined the registrant’s sales did not run
afoul of any statute. 143 In these cases, the registrant has no cause to
appeal, and the other party—in an inter partes dispute—has no
incentive to question the Board’s authority to impose the requirement,
only its application thereof. Making an appeal to the courts can also be
whether (or not) the TTAB considers itself bound by the ACP’s lawful use decision in Coahoma,
clearly no court is bound by that administrative ruling.
141. The TTAB has inexplicably claimed that Smith v. Coahoma somehow approved of the
PTO’s lawful use requirement. In Satinine, the TTAB argued that because the Smith court
“referred only to the issue of whether the shipments in question were legal, and made no mention
of any issue as to the propriety of the ‘lawful use’ doctrine . . . , it appears that the Court approved
of that doctrine.” Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et
Appareils de Beaute, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 964 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1981). The TTAB added that “[o]n
this authority, and for reasons of public policy, the Board has continued the practice of refusing to
recognize ‘unlawful use’ for purposes of registration.” Id.
The TTAB, however, clearly misread the Smith court’s opinion. The TTAB focused myopically
on the last paragraph of Smith, where the court declared that it was “also unnecessary to pass
upon the [ACP’s] denial of appellant’s” request to consider new evidence regarding its FIFRA
violation. 264 F.2d at 920 (emphasis added). In the second to last paragraph in Smith, however,
the court declared that it was “unnecessary to pass on the other grounds on which the decision of
the Assistant Commissioner was based,” grounds which clearly included the lawful use
requirement. Id.
142. The PTO has erroneously claimed that another Federal Circuit case endorsed the agency’s
lawful use requirement. See TMEP, supra note 60, § 907 (citing Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown,
823 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1987), for the proposition that “[u]se of a mark in commerce must be
lawful use to be the basis for federal registration of the mark”). Daffy Dan’s, however, is not even
a lawful use requirement case. The court mentions “lawful use” only in the context of concurrent
registration, for which the Lanham Act does specifically require “concurrent lawful use.” Daffy
Dan’s, 823 F.2d at 525–26; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). But as discussed below, in the context of concurrent
registration, “lawful use” means exclusive use, not use that comports with other laws. See infra
Section II.A (dissecting the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement); see also McElwain,
supra note 26 (noting that Daffy Dan’s “did not involve any alleged violation of a federal statute or
implicate Rule 2.69 in any way”).
143. For example, in Satinine, the TTAB dismissed the petition for cancellation after
concluding that the registrant’s sales of cosmetics did not violate the FDCA. See supra note 103.
The lawful use requirement still imposes heavy costs on registrants, however, even when the PTO
finds the requirement has not been violated, i.e., even when the agency does not refuse/cancel
registration. After all, the registrant still has to convince the agency that its sales were lawful,
which can be a very burdensome undertaking, as discussed infra in Section III.C.
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costly for the aggrieved party. In ex parte proceedings, for example, if a
disgruntled applicant opts to initiate a new civil suit against the PTO
in district court, the applicant bears not only its own legal expenses, but
“all the expenses of the proceeding,” including the PTO’s expenses,
regardless of the outcome of the appeal. 144 Furthermore, as the
requirement became increasingly “well settled” at the PTO, parties may
have come to believe that appeal to the courts would prove futile,
especially given the TTAB’s unfounded claims that the courts had
already upheld the Agency’s authority to impose the requirement. 145
Finally, some parties might have been reluctant to appeal TTAB lawful
use decisions because doing so might draw attention to the fact they
had violated some nontrademark law. For example, before the DOJ
hinted it would no longer enforce the federal marijuana ban, 146
marijuana suppliers might have feared that challenging the lawful use
requirement in court would draw the ire of the DOJ and help lay the
groundwork for criminal prosecutions against them. For these reasons
and others, 147 it is easy to see why so few parties have sought judicial
review of the PTO’s lawful use requirement over the past six decades.
2. “Unlawful Use” in Trademark Infringement Litigation
Despite the paucity of judicial scrutiny of PTO lawful use
decisions, a handful of courts has reflexively adopted the Agency’s
lawful use requirement for use in a different context: trademark
infringement proceedings. 148 Namely, these courts have held that a
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3). Until recently, the expenses covered by the provision were thought
to include even the PTO’s attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 225 (4th
Cir. 2015) (holding that § 1071(b)(3) “imposes a unilateral, compensatory fee, including attorneys
fees, on every ex parte applicant who elects to engage the resources of the PTO when pursuing a
de novo action in the district court, whether the applicant wins or loses”). The Supreme Court,
however, recently held that an identical rule used in patent cases does not authorize the shifting
of attorneys’ fees, and that holding likely bars attorney fee shifting in trademark cases as well.
Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2019).
145. See supra notes 141–142.
146. See infra note 350.
147. For example, before the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Indus., Inc., losing parties may also have believed they could relitigate the TTAB’s factual
determinations in court if later sued for infringement. See 575 U.S. 138, 160 (2015) (clarifying that
issue preclusion applies to prior TTAB adjudications). This belief would have further reduced the
impetus to take appeal from TTAB lawful use decisions. As Professor Rebecca Tushnet has
observed, the B & B Hardware Court “raised the stakes of contested registration proceedings.”
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 892.
148. To date, only two federal courts of appeal, along with a sprinkling of federal district courts
outside those circuits, have recognized this unlawful use defense. See, e.g., CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA
Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “only lawful use in commerce can
give rise to trademark priority”); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d
1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Lanham Act protects marks “lawfully used in
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mark owner’s “unlawful use” of its mark constitutes a valid defense
against infringement of the mark, notwithstanding any likelihood of
confusion. 149
In large part, the courts have based this “unlawful use” defense
on the PTO’s lawful use requirement. 150 In the most notable of these
court decisions, the Ninth Circuit panel in CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA
Health Sciences., Inc. wrote that “we . . . agree with the PTO’s policy
and hold that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark
priority.” 151 It therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s trademark
infringement claim in the case, based on defendant’s undisputed
allegation that plaintiff’s prior sales of dietary supplements had
violated the FDCA. 152 In following the PTO’s requirement, the CreAgri
court scrutinized neither the PTO’s statutory authority to demand
lawful use for registration (which was irrelevant in the case) nor its own
authority to demand lawful use for trademark protection. Rather, it
largely rested on the TTAB’s opinion in Stellar, reasoning that
as a logical matter, to hold otherwise would be to put the government in the “anomalous
position” of extending the benefits of trademark protection to a seller based upon actions
the seller took in violation of that government’s own laws. . . . It is doubtful that the
trademark statute—passed pursuant to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause—
“was . . . intended to recognize . . . shipments in commerce in contravention of other
regulatory acts promulgated [by Congress] under [that same constitutional
provision].” 153

The CreAgri court also proffered a new argument for demanding
lawful use, tersely suggesting that “as a policy matter, to give
commerce”); Woodstock Ventures LC v. Woodstock Roots, LLC, 387 F. Supp. 3d 306, 318 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (refusing to recognize defendant’s intent to expand into marijuana market “because the sale
of recreational marijuana is illegal under federal law”); Sream, Inc. v. Superior Disc., LLC, No. 178177, 2019 WL 2124887, at *5 (E.D. La. May 15, 2019) (“Trademark rights cannot develop during
periods of time when a mark is used in connection with goods which could not be lawfully shipped
in interstate commerce.”); Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLC, 262 F. Supp.
3d 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Where a trademark’s use in commerce is not lawful, the mark may
be canceled.”); Tassel Ridge Winery, LLC v. Woodmill Winery, Inc., No. 11-cv-00066, 2013 WL
5567505, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2013) (holding that “use in commerce must be lawful” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int’l, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 4,
7 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (assuming unlawful use defense exists). A handful of courts have acknowledged
but not yet adopted the defense. E.g., FN Herstal SA v. Clyde Armory Inc., 838 F.3d 1071, 1086–
87 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “[t]his Court has not adopted the unlawful use doctrine and need
not do so today” (footnote omitted)).
149. Astrachan, supra note 26, at 287 (explaining that “there is no infringement because the
plaintiff does not have a protectable mark”).
150. E.g., United Phosphorus, 205 F.3d at 1225 (relying upon TTAB cases to conclude that
“shipping goods in violation of federal law cannot qualify as the ‘use in commerce’ necessary to
establish trademark rights”).
151. 474 F.3d at 630.
152. Id. at 630–31.
153. Id. at 630 (quoting In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48, 51 (T.T.A.B. 1968)
(alterations in original)).
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trademark priority to a seller who rushes to market without taking care
to carefully comply with the relevant regulations would be to reward
the hasty at the expense of the diligent.” 154
The courts’ failure to scrutinize the PTO’s policy is unfortunate,
but by the time the unlawful use defense first surfaced in litigation,
courts may have assumed (mistakenly) that the Agency’s policy had
already been carefully vetted in appeals taken from the Agency’s lawful
use registration decisions. After all, the PTO had been demanding
lawful use for nearly two decades before the first district court
recognized the unlawful use defense in 1975, 155 and for at least five
decades before any federal court of appeals got around to recognizing
the defense. As the CreAgri court remarked in its decision in 2007, “[i]t
has long been the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
that use in commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is
lawful.” 156 The longevity of the rule may thus have insulated the PTO’s
requirement from closer scrutiny.
The courts’ deference to the PTO’s lawful use policy may have
also stemmed from a desire to harmonize the rules applicable to
registration and infringement proceedings. Because a court presiding
over an infringement lawsuit may cancel registration, infringement
litigation serves as an alternative to petitioning the PTO for
cancellation. 157 To avoid creating different registration standards for
infringement lawsuits, courts may have felt pressured to follow the
PTO’s lawful use policy, even if the courts did not necessarily agree with
it. 158 And even if they strongly disagreed with the PTO, courts hearing
trademark infringement lawsuits could do little about it. The courts
could only order the Agency to change its requirements for registration
in an appeal from one of the Agency’s registration proceedings. 159
154. Id. Section III.B debunks this fairness argument.
155. See Cameo, Inc. v. Plough, Inc., No. C73-177, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14527 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 3, 1975), vacated, 517 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1975); Cooper, supra note 26, at 50 (confirming that
Plough was the first court case to recognize the unlawful use defense under the Lanham Act).
156. CreAgri, 474 F.3d at 630 (emphasis added and omitted).
157. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 155 (2015) (recognizing
that “district courts can cancel registrations during infringement litigation”).
158. Cf. Wasserman, supra note 65, at 1561 (suggesting courts might defer to the PTO when
the Agency is first to confront an issue). In Sream, Inc. v. Superior Disc., LLC, for example, the
court emphasized that “ ‘[t]he general principles qualifying a mark for registration . . . are for the
most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection.’ ” No.
17-8177, 2019 WL 2124887, at *5 (E.D. La. May 15, 2019) (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). Noting the TTAB’s decision in In re Stellar, the court proceeded to
find that the lawful use principle “applies by analogy to the development of common law rights in
unregistered trademarks.” Id.
159. With respect to trademark infringement decisions issued by courts, the TTAB is bound
only as regards that case and the specific mark at issue in it. To be sure, the TTAB might consider
infringement decisions to be persuasive authority. However, the Board itself has declared that it
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In addition to taking their cues from the PTO, courts recognizing
the unlawful use defense may have also been inspired by the equitable
clean hands doctrine. 160 In a nutshell, the clean hands doctrine bars
judicial relief when a party has engaged in serious and intentional
(though not necessarily unlawful) wrongdoing that has a direct
connection to the party’s claim for relief. 161 Long before any court
recognized the unlawful use defense, and before passage of the Lanham
Act, federal courts had recognized a clean hands defense to trademark
infringement. 162 The defense was usually, though not always, applied
against mark owners who had intentionally deceived the public through
the use of their marks 163—a wrong the Lanham Act now addresses
directly and explicitly. 164 Although modern courts have rarely
mentioned “clean hands” alongside unlawful use, several commentators
have conjectured that the unlawful use defense was inspired by the
clean hands doctrine. 165

“relies primarily on precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,” and not other
federal courts, in trademark registration proceedings. TBMP, supra note 66, § 101.03.
160. See Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944) (recalling the adage that
“he who comes into equity must come with clean hands”). The relationship between the PTO’s
lawful use reasoning and the clean hands doctrine is discussed infra in Section II.C.3.
161. See Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 LEGAL THEORY
171, 173 (2011) (defining unclean hands as “[a]ny willful conduct that is iniquitous, unfair,
dishonest, fraudulent, unconscionable, or performed in bad faith” that has a connection with the
party’s cause of action). For ease of exposition, I use “clean hands” to refer to a set of similar legal
and equitable doctrines. See id. at 176 (noting similarities among clean hands, in pari delicto, and
ex turpi causa non oritur actio doctrines).
162. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 26, at 39–42 (discussing early cases).
163. See, e.g., Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 535 (1903):
It is well settled that if a person wishes his trade-mark property to be protected by a
court of equity, he must come into court with clean hands, and if it appears that the
trade-mark for which he seeks protection is itself a misrepresentation to the public, and
has acquired a value with the public by fraudulent misrepresentations in
advertisements, all relief will be denied to him.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (barring recovery for infringement of SYRUP OF FIGS because
a mark falsely suggested plaintiff’s medicine contained figs); Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108
U.S. 218, 222 (1883) (“A court of equity will extend no aid to sustain a claim to a trade-mark of an
article which is put forth with a misrepresentation to the public as to the manufacturer of the
article, and as to the place where it is manufactured . . . .”).
164. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (barring registration of marks that are, inter alia, “deceptively
misdescriptive” or geographically deceptively misdescriptive of the goods on which they are used).
165. Cooper, supra note 26, at 38 (suggesting unlawful use doctrine developed to help clarify
the sorts of conduct that will be considered sanctionable under the nebulous clean hands doctrine);
McElwain, supra note 26 (suggesting “[t]he source of [the] concern [expressed in In re Stellar],
though not usually articulated,” is the unclean hands doctrine). As discussed more fully below,
however, the unlawful use defense and lawful use requirement are far broader than the clean
hands doctrine, thereby undermining any suggestion that the defense and the requirement are
based on the ancient equitable doctrine. See infra Section II.C.3.
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D. Summary
Although the Lanham Act does not expressly require lawful use
of a mark, the PTO has insisted upon compliance with an everexpanding array of statutes as a condition for trademark registration.
The Agency has seldom addressed its statutory authority to impose this
lawful use requirement. Instead, to the extent the PTO has sought to
justify the requirement at all, it has made a hodgepodge of thinly
developed arguments based mostly on abstract principles of law and
policy considerations. But even as it has defended the requirement, the
PTO has recognized some of the practical challenges posed by policing
compliance with nontrademark laws, and it has thus grafted various
limitations onto its creation.
In its seven-plus decades of existence, the courts have never
closely scrutinized the PTO’s lawful use requirement. To a large extent,
they simply have not had the opportunity. Few of the Agency’s lawful
use decisions have been appealed to the courts, and courts have found
simpler, alternative grounds upon which to decide those few appeals
that have been taken. However, this lack of scrutiny has not stopped
some courts from blindly following the PTO and adopting the Agency’s
lawful use requirement as a defense to trademark infringement.
The next two Parts subject the lawful use requirement to longoverdue scrutiny. They explain why each of the arguments the PTO has
made to defend the requirement are misguided or unfounded. They also
offer additional insights to help demonstrate that the lawful use
requirement is both unauthorized and unwise.
II. UNAUTHORIZED: THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE LAWFUL
USE
This Part mounts the first of two fundamental challenges to the
lawful use requirement. It scrutinizes the text and history of the
Lanham Act, along with the legal principles invoked by the PTO, to
demonstrate that the Agency lacks authority to demand lawful use for
registration. Put simply, Congress did not want the PTO to police
compliance with other statutes when administering the Lanham Act’s
registration system. Thus, even if the lawful use requirement were a
good trademark policy (it is not, for reasons discussed in the next Part),
the requirement would still be ultra vires and unenforceable.
Section A begins by analyzing the Lanham Act’s “use in
commerce” requirement. The statute plainly indicates that this
requirement is satisfied by the sale or transportation of a good bearing
a mark, without regard to the legality of such sale or transportation.
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Furthermore, demanding compliance with other laws bears no
relationship to the purposes behind requiring “use in commerce.”
Section A also debunks the PTO’s lone textual argument for demanding
lawful use—the notion that, because Congress explicitly required
“lawful use” for registration on the supplemental register, it necessarily
(albeit implicitly) intended to do so for the principal register as well.
This argument is inconsistent with both the basic tenets of statutory
interpretation and the settled meaning of the phrase “lawful use” as it
is used elsewhere in the Lanham Act.
Section B then examines a provision of the Lanham Act that has
been ignored by the PTO in lawful use cases. This provision specifies
the exclusive grounds upon which the Agency may refuse registration
of marks used in commerce, and it would have been the natural place
for Congress to prohibit registration of marks used in connection with
unlawful acts. Congress, however, included no such prohibition in the
Lanham Act, a conspicuous omission, given that Congress had
expressly barred protection of marks used in unlawful businesses in
every prior trademark statute passed before the Act.
Section C turns to the general legal principles the PTO has cited
to justify the lawful use requirement. It shows that the PTO has
mischaracterized those principles. Contrary to the PTO’s assertion in
Coahoma, for example, it is widely recognized that one can acquire valid
property rights via wrongful acts. In any event, the Agency has
overstepped its authority in basing registration requirements on
general principles of law, rather than the express language of the
Lanham Act.
Section D then explains that the PTO has no power to revise the
Lanham Act’s registration requirements on its own initiative. The
lawful use requirement, in other words, cannot be sustained as an
exercise in the Agency’s rulemaking authority.
A. The Statutory “Use in Commerce” Requirement
The Lanham Act expressly requires an applicant to “use [a
mark] in commerce” to register the mark on the principal register. 166
Importantly, however, the statute itself does not require use of the
mark to be lawful, at least in the sense now demanded by the PTO—as
in compliance with all other federal statutes.
Section 45 of the Act expressly declares that the “use in
commerce” requirement “shall be deemed” satisfied when a mark “is
placed in any manner on . . . goods” and “the goods are sold or
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
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transported in commerce.” 167 Furthermore, the statute defines
“commerce” expansively, to encompass “all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress,” 168 i.e., not just commerce that
Congress considers lawful. Thus, the plain language of the Lanham Act
indicates that the “use in commerce” requirement is satisfied when an
applicant sells or transports goods bearing her mark, without regard to
whether such sale or transportation comports with other laws.
The PTO’s demand that sale of a trademarked good comport
with all federal statutes also bears no relationship to the purposes of
the “use in commerce” requirement. Congress has required mark
owners to “use” their marks, in the sense of affixing their marks to a
good, since the earliest federal trademark laws. 169 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, “the right to a particular mark grows
out of its use, not its mere adoption.” 170 The purpose of requiring use in
this sense is straightforward: affixing the mark to a good establishes
the critical connection between the mark and the maker of the good in
the minds of consumers. 171 No such connection would be established if
a mark owner could simply reserve rights to a word, name, symbol, etc.,
without actually placing the mark on a product. To ensure that a given
mark consistently identifies the source of a good, the Lanham Act
ordains that the first party to use the mark can block anyone else from
later using the same mark or a confusingly similar mark—that is, the
first user has priority over the mark, because consumers will assume
that products bearing that mark were made by that party (the first
user). Demanding use of a mark is thus an integral part of a trademark
system that is, in large part, designed to help consumers identify the
source of goods they consume.
Demanding compliance with other statutes, however, is hardly
necessary for the trademark system to serve this critical sourceidentification function. Whether or not the sale of a trademarked good
violates some other statute besides the Lanham Act does not affect the
mark’s ability to help consumers identify the source of the good. There
167. Id. § 1127(1).
168. Id. (emphasis added). The only commerce (i.e., sales or transportation of goods) that falls
outside of this expansive statutory definition is the rare sale or transportation of a good that
Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause, which is the source of Congress’s
constitutional power to regulate trademarks. See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying text.
169. For example, Congress’s 1870 trademark statute required “use”—albeit not necessarily
use “in commerce”—for protection of a mark. Trademark Law of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, § 78, 16
Stat. 198, 212.
170. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark” as “any word, name, symbol, or
device . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the sources of the goods”); infra Section III.A
(discussing the Lanham Act’s source identification function).
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is simply no reason to think that the use of a mark that complies with
the Lanham Act but violates another law, like the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) or the California Vehicle Code, would
necessarily deceive or confuse consumers. For example, a consumer who
sees a mark like WILLIE’S RESERVE used on cannabis is unlikely to
be confused about the source of that cannabis just because the sale of
the drug violates the CSA. (In fact, as discussed below in Section III.A,
the lawful use requirement may contribute to consumer confusion
rather than combat it because the requirement prevents companies
from protecting their brands, like WILLIE’S RESERVE, from being
used by rivals who seek to exploit consumer confusion.) The story would
be different, of course, if the use of the mark violated the Lanham Act,
say, because it was confusingly similar to another previously used
mark. Imagine, for example, if the consumer saw a cannabis-infused
edible branded KEEF KAT that was not made by or under license with
the Hershey Company, the owner of the KIT KAT mark in the United
States. In that case, the consumer likely would be confused about who
made the edible. But the lawful use requirement is not needed to
combat violations of the Lanham Act, because the Lanham Act
expressly makes infringing use actionable. 172 Indeed, the lawful use
requirement only kicks in when some other statute, besides the
Lanham Act, has been violated.
Not only is the lawful use requirement unrelated to the purpose
of requiring “use” of a mark, it is also unrelated to the purpose of
requiring such use to be “in commerce.” The “in commerce” language of
section 1 serves a purely jurisdictional function. Namely, it provides the
jurisdictional “hook” Congress needs to regulate trademarks under the
Commerce Clause. 173 In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court
held that Congress lacked power to regulate trademarks under the
Intellectual Property Clause. 174 At the same time, however, the Court
suggested that federal trademark legislation might fare better if passed
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, so long as Congress expressly
limited application of its statute “to the use of trade-marks in
172. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (amended 1962):
Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant . . . use in commerce any
reproduction . . . [of any] registered mark in connection with the sale . . . of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive [purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or
services] . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . .
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
174. 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879). The Intellectual Property Clause (or Patents and Copyrights
Clause) gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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[interstate] commerce.” 175 Thus, in every trademark law it has adopted
since The Trade-Mark Cases were decided, Congress has demanded
“use in commerce” to ensure that the statute fits comfortably within its
Commerce Clause authority. 176
Not surprisingly, the Congress that passed the Lanham Act
sought to maximize the reach of its trademark law. Hence, as noted
above, Congress defined “commerce” expansively to cover “all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” 177 The Supreme Court
has characterized this language as giving the Lanham Act a “sweeping
reach” and conferring a “broad jurisdictional grant,” 178 especially in
light of the Court’s modern, capacious interpretation of the Commerce
Clause.
Once again, however, the PTO’s lawful use requirement bears
no relation to this jurisdictional purpose. Congress’s definition of the
“use in commerce” requirement is focused entirely on whether Congress
may regulate some activity. That definition plainly seeks to extend the
reach of the statute to all activity Congress may regulate, regardless of
how (or even whether) Congress has regulated the activity. The PTO’s
lawful use requirement, by contrast, is focused entirely on how
Congress has regulated some activity—namely, whether Congress has
banned the sale of a good on which a mark is used. The PTO’s reasoning
in trademark registration proceedings evidences the Agency’s confusion
and its erroneous conflation of these two distinct issues. For example,
in East West Bank Co. v. Plubell Firm LLC, the TTAB suggested that
“[t]he unlawful use in commerce doctrine is derived from Section 45 of
the Trademark Act, . . . which defines ‘commerce’ as ‘all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.’ Thus, in order to obtain
a federal registration, use of a mark in commerce must be lawful.” 179 In
other words, the TTAB brazenly reordered the words of the Lanham Act
to conclude that “commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress” is the same as “commerce that Congress has made lawful.”

175. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97. For a deeper dive into the connection between the
Intellectual Property Clause and trademarks, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property
Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1360–61 (2012).
176. Trademark Law of 1881, Pub. L. No. 46-138, 21 Stat. 502, 503 (providing for registration
of marks “used in commerce with foreign nations or Indian tribes”); Trademark Law of 1905, Pub.
L. No. 58-84, § 2, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (providing the same); Trademark Law of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66163, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (implementing 1910 treaty by providing for registration of certain marks,
“which have been in bona fide use for not less than one year in interstate or foreign commerce, or
commerce with the Indian tribes”).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
178. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286–87 (1952).
179. No. 92053712, 2016 WL 5219824, at *13 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2016) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the PTO’s interpretation of “commerce” in section 1
makes little sense when applied to other sections of the Lanham Act
that employ that same term. Consider, for example, section 32 of the
Lanham Act, which authorizes the owner of any registered mark to
recover damages from any person “who shall, in commerce, . . . use” its
registered mark without permission, in a way that is “likely to cause
confusion, or mistake, or to deceive” purchasers as to the source of
goods. 180 In the context of section 32, interpreting “commerce” to cover
only lawful commerce would generate truly bizarre results. It would
allow mark owners to sue for infringement, but only if an infringer had
not also violated some other nontrademark law while using the mark;
in other words, mark owners could sue only if the infringer’s use of the
mark had otherwise been lawful. To see why, return to the KEEF KAT
example from above. If the PTO’s interpretation of “commerce” were
correct, the Hershey Company could not pursue a trademark
infringement action against the maker of KEEF KAT. After all, the sale
of the marijuana edible bearing the KEEF KAT mark would not be
lawful under federal law, and thus, would not constitute use “in [lawful]
commerce” for purposes of section 32. 181 Not surprisingly, no court has
interpreted the term “commerce” to mean only “lawful commerce” for
purposes of section 32. Given the “normal rule of statutory construction
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning,” 182 the PTO’s narrowing interpretation of
the word “commerce” in section 1 is out of place and should not stand.
Notably, the TTAB has seldom bothered to address the key
language of sections 1 or 45 in devising and defending its lawful use
requirement. As discussed above in Section I.B.2, the TTAB did not
make any textualist argument for the lawful use requirement until
roughly thirty-five years after passage of the Lanham Act. In Satinine,
Member Kera suggested that “lawful” use was necessarily implied by
section 1 (the section governing the principal register) because section
23 of the Lanham Act, which governs the supplemental register,
explicitly conditioned registration on that register on “lawful use in
commerce.” 183 Member Kera reasoned that “it would be wholly
contradictory to require ‘lawful use’ for an application to register a mark
upon the Supplemental Register but not to require ‘lawful use’ for an
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (amended 1962).
181. Indeed, because infringing use is, by definition, unlawful under the Lanham Act, no
plaintiff could recover damages for infringement under section 32, if that provision were
interpreted to apply only to infringing, lawful use of a mark.
182. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 964 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
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application to register a mark upon the Principal Register, which
confers much greater rights upon the registrant.” 184 Although Member
Kera did not mention it, the Lanham Act includes a second explicit
reference to “lawful use,” this one among the requirements for
concurrent registration of a mark. In particular, section 2 allows a party
to register a mark already registered by an unrelated party if the
applicant shows “concurrent lawful use” of the mark prior to the date
the first party applied to register the mark. 185
But this statutory interpretation argument is unfounded, for two
primary reasons. First, it directly contravenes the “familiar principle of
statutory construction . . . that a negative inference may be drawn from
the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included
in other provisions of the same statute.” 186 Contrary to Member Kera’s
suggestion, then, the fact that the Lanham Act expressly refers to
“lawful use in commerce” in section 23—but not section 1—strongly
suggests that the obligation to obey other laws (if it exists at all) applies
only to the former section governing the supplemental register. In other
words, Member Kera got the statutory interpretation argument
completely backwards. Indeed, Member Rice, who, as noted earlier,
expressed doubts about the PTO’s statutory authority to impose the
lawful use requirement in Satinine, flatly rejected Member Kera’s
reasoning: “Inasmuch as the term ‘lawful’ is specifically used in certain
sections of the Statute, the suggestion that this term should be read
into those sections where it is not used would appear to be a violation
of the basic rules of statutory construction.” 187
Second, and even more fundamentally, Member Kera’s statutory
argument misconstrues the meaning of “lawful use” for purposes of
section 23. In particular, Member Kera’s assumption that “lawful use”
in section 23 (and presumably, other sections of the Lanham Act that
employ similar language) means “use that is in compliance with all
184. Id. at 967 (Kera, Member, concurring)
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 1067, 1071 (both referring to “lawful
concurrent user”). Concurrent use registration is permitted only if there is no likelihood of
confusion and the party seeking registration had used the mark in commerce before the other party
sought registration on the principal register (or else has that party’s consent). In 1999, Congress
added a third reference to “lawful use” addressed to cyberpiracy. This amendment makes a party
liable for “bad faith intent to profit” from the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to
a mark protected by the Lanham Act, but it also creates a safe harbor for defendants who “believed
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
lawful.” Id. § 1125(d)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
186. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (emphasis added); see also Romag
Fasteners, Inc v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495 (2020) (“Nor does this Court usually read into
statutes words that aren’t there. It’s a temptation we are doubly careful to avoid when Congress
has (as here) included the term in question elsewhere in the very same statutory provision.”).
187. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 964 n.2.

2022]

UNAUTHORIZED AND UNWISE

199

federal statutes” is just plain wrong. The term “lawful use” in these
sections has been consistently interpreted to mean in compliance with
other provisions of the Lanham Act rather than in compliance with all
federal laws. 188 With respect to the supplemental register (section 23),
“lawful use” is understood to mean the exclusive use of a mark. 189 With
respect to concurrent registration (section 2(d)), “concurrent lawful use”
is understood to mean use of a mark in a particular geographic area
that predates another party’s registration of the same mark (i.e., use
that is consistent with rules allowing for concurrent use). 190 In other
words, the Lanham Act allows a party to concurrently use a mark
similar to one on the principal register, but only if the party had used
the mark in commerce before the other party had sought registration
on the principal register. 191
So understood, where Congress expressly refers to “lawful use”
of a mark in the Lanham Act, the term “lawful” appears to modify “use”
rather than “commerce.” This is more than a semantic difference. The
lawful use of a trademark is distinguishable from the use of a mark
(lawful or otherwise) in lawful commerce. As explained above, use
entails affixing the mark to a good, while commerce refers to the sale of
the good. One could use a mark unlawfully without necessarily violating
a separate law restricting the sale of the good. Consider, for example,
Modest Brewing Company affixing the name DILLY DILLY ALE to one
of its beers. The use of this mark without Budweiser’s permission likely
violated the Lanham Act, even though the sale of the beer violated no
other law. 192 Conversely, one could use a mark lawfully, but still break
the law in selling the good on which it was affixed. Imagine, for
example, Budweiser affixing its mark to a case of cannabis-infused beer,
calling it CANNABUDWEISER. The sale of this beer in commerce
188. See Rabe, supra note 26, at 323.
189. Richard L. Kirkpatrick, The Supplemental Register Under the Trademark Revision Act:
Additions, Deletions and Omissions, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 248, 258–61 (1989) (explaining historical
rationale behind requiring lawful qua exclusive use of a mark for registration on the supplemental
register). While some commentators have criticized the prevailing interpretation of “lawful use,”
none have suggested that “lawful” means in compliance with all federal law. E.g., LaLonde &
Gilson, supra note 107, at 839–41.
190. E.g., Fleming Cos. v. Thriftway, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 38, 42 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (“A ‘lawful use’
is the use of a mark in connection with goods or services in a territory not covered by another
party’s registration.”).
191. Finally, with respect to the cyberpiracy provision added in 1999 (§ 1125(d)), “lawful use”
is understood as use that does not infringe the trademark rights of another party, say, because the
trademark was merely descriptive. E.g., Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir.
2009) (noting defendant’s claim that mark was merely descriptive and thus not entitled to
trademark protection but rejecting claim as disingenuous).
192. Tim Nudd, Bud Light Sent a Hilarious Cease-and-Desist Scroll to the Makers of ‘Dilly
Dilly’ Ale, ADWEEK (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/creativity/bud-light-sent-a-hilariouscease-and-desist-scroll-to-the-makers-of-dilly-dilly-ale/ [https://perma.cc/A7P4-TXK2].
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would violate federal laws against the distribution of marijuana, even
though the use of the mark was perfectly legal under the terms of the
Lanham Act.
Simply put, in the few places where Congress explicitly referred
to “lawful use” in the text of the Lanham Act, it did so to indicate that
trademark rights were reserved for mark owners who complied with
other parts of the Lanham Act—e.g., for those whose use of a mark did
not infringe on the rights of other mark owners, deceive consumers, and
so on. Once we understand what it meant by “lawful” in these other
sections of the Lanham Act, Congress’s decision to omit the term
“lawful” from section 1 makes perfect sense. Other language of section
1 already makes compliance with the rest of the Lanham Act a condition
for registration on the principal register. For example, section 1
explicitly requires a mark owner to vouch in its registration application
that “to the best of [its] knowledge and belief, no other person has the
right to use such mark in commerce” and the use thereof is not likely
“to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 193 It was thus
unnecessary for Congress to insist that use of a mark be “lawful,” in the
sense of not being confusingly similar, etc. to another registered mark.
Over the years, the PTO has made various exceptions to its
lawful use requirement that further disregard actual statutory text.
Rather than demanding strict compliance with all laws (which is
presumably what an express “lawful commerce” requirement would
entail), the Agency now demands only partial compliance with a subset
of laws. As discussed above, the Agency suggests that the Lanham Act
only bars registration based on violations that have already been
adjudicated by another federal agency or court, or those that the PTO
itself considers to be “per se” violations of law—and then, only when the
violation involves federal law, and only when the Agency considers the
violation to be “material,” and then, only when it has “some nexus” to
the wrongdoer’s use of its mark. Putting aside the daunting problems
the Agency has encountered in defining and applying these exceptions
(Section III.D exposes those problems), the exceptions undermine any
claim that the lawful use requirement is based on the text of the
Lanham Act. In fact, the PTO has never even bothered to try to connect
the idiosyncrasies of the requirement it now applies to any statutory
language.

193. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(D).

2022]

UNAUTHORIZED AND UNWISE

201

B. The Statutory Grounds for Refusing Registration
In the Lanham Act, Congress also specified the specific grounds
upon which the PTO could refuse registration of a mark that otherwise
satisfied the requirements of section 1. The grounds for refusal are
expressly enumerated in section 2 of the Lanham Act. To simplify
somewhat, section 2 bars registration for only the following specific
categories of marks: immoral, deceptive, scandalous, disparaging,
geographical, confusing, merely descriptive, or functional marks; marks
consisting of the flag or insignia of a government; marks consisting of
the name, image, or signature of a living person or dead president
without their consent; and marks that consist primarily merely of a
surname. 194 The Supreme Court has recently invalidated three of these
grounds for refusal—the bans on immoral, scandalous, and disparaging
marks—on constitutional grounds. 195
Had Congress intended to preclude registration of a mark
because it was used in unlawful commerce, section 2 would have been
the natural place to put such a restriction. However, violation of other
laws is not among the prohibitions specifically enumerated in section 2.
Several factors suggest the omission was no mere oversight—in other
words, that there exists no implied bar against registration based on
violations of other statutes.
First, Congress expressly forbade the PTO from refusing
registration for any reason other than the grounds specifically
enumerated in section 2. The section declares that “No
trademark . . . shall be refused . . . on account of its nature unless” it
falls into one of the specific prohibitions listed above. 196 The language
of section 2 thus refutes the notion that the Lanham Act implicitly bars
registration based on violations of other statutes.
Second, the PTO’s prohibition on the registration of marks used
in unlawful commerce is different in kind from the prohibitions
Congress listed in section 2. 197 Each of those enumerated prohibitions
targets controversies with the mark itself—for example, that the mark
is misleading or scandalous—rather than controversies with the goods
on which a mark is used—for example, that the good is scandalous or
that the sale of it is unlawful. To illustrate, consider section 2’s ban on
marks that are confusingly similar to other marks and marks that are
194. Id. § 1052.
195. See sources cited supra note 42.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (emphases added).
197. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (“Under
the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the general term
should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.”).
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merely descriptive. 198 Such marks are objectionable because they are
not distinctive, 199 and thus, cannot perform one of the prime functions
performed by a mark—namely, helping consumers identify the source
of a good. 200 Importantly, however, the Lanham Act does not bar the
registration of a distinctive mark used on an undistinctive product. In
other words, a mark owner could successfully register a distinctive
mark even if it is used on a generic good like aspirin—think of BAYER®
aspirin. By contrast, the PTO’s lawful use requirement is concerned
solely with problems with the goods on which a mark is used, or even
more precisely, problems with the sale of those goods, namely, that the
sale of those goods violates some other federal law.
Third, the omission from the Lanham Act of an express
prohibition on registration of marks used in unlawful commerce is
especially noteworthy because Congress had expressly barred recovery
for infringement of marks used in unlawful commerce in every prior
trademark statute it had passed. Congress’s early forays into trademark
law—including key statutes passed in 1870, 1881, 1905, and 1920—
were modest. These statutes created limited federal protection for
trademarks, including a cause of action for trademark infringement. 201
But each of these early federal trademark laws expressly adopted
something like our present-day lawful use requirement, namely, a
provision denying certain trademark rights to parties who had engaged
in actions that violated other statutes. The 1870 federal trademark
statute is illustrative. This short statute created a cause of action for
“wrongful use” of a trademark, but then expressly declared “[t]hat no
action shall be maintained under . . . this act by any person claiming
the exclusive right to any trade-mark which is used or claimed in any
unlawful business.” 202
Every other major trademark law passed prior to the Lanham
Act included a similar provision that expressly denied relief to the
owner of a mark who used it in an “unlawful business.” 203 These
provisions demonstrate one critical point: before the passage of the
Lanham Act, Congress clearly indicated that it wanted to make federal
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)-(e).
199. Distinctiveness is typically judged along a spectrum, the details of which are not relevant
here. See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
200. This purpose is discussed infra in Section III.A.
201. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 51, at 60 (describing early statutes as “largely
ineffective”).
202. Act of July 8, 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, § 84, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (emphasis added).
203. Trademark statutes passed in 1881, 1905, and 1920 adopted language that was nearly
identical. Trademark Law of 1881, Pub. L. No. 46-138, § 8, 21 Stat. 502, 504; Trademark Law of
1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 21, 33 Stat. 724, 729; Trademark Law of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-163, § 6,
41 Stat. 533, 535 (incorporating earlier bars by reference).
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trademark protection conditional on compliance with other laws, at
least to some degree. 204 The fact that Congress dropped this express
bar—which had been a fixture of federal trademark law since 1870—
suggests it did not wish to carry forward the prohibition when it
overhauled federal trademark law in 1946. 205
The omission of a broad bar to registration is even more
noteworthy because Congress did make violation of one type of law—
federal antitrust law—a defense against a trademark infringement
lawsuit under the Lanham Act. Specifically, section 33 of the Act
provides that it is a defense to any infringement action that the mark
in question “has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of
the United States.” 206 The defense may have been added to the Lanham
Act out of concerns that trademarks were being used to perpetrate
antitrust violations. 207 The defense, however, does not apply to
violations of any other federal (or state) statute. While the antitrust
provision constitutes a bar to recovery for infringement, rather than a
bar to registration, it nonetheless shows that Congress knew how to
expressly condition trademark rights on compliance with other laws. In
similar circumstances, courts have routinely refused to recognize
implied prohibitions in one section of a statute when Congress expressly
included similar prohibitions in other sections of the same statute. 208
The foregoing arguments strongly suggest that the omission of
an express bar against registration of marks used in unlawful
commerce was no mere oversight in the Lanham Act. Although there is
no legislative history regarding why Congress abandoned the express
prohibition on registration of marks used in unlawful businesses, Part
III below offers several compelling reasons why Congress might not
have wanted the PTO to assess compliance with nontrademark laws
when administering the trademark registration system. For example,
204. Although few cases applied the provisions, most courts interpreted the bars as essentially
codifying the clean hands doctrine. See Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 107–
10 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Cooper, supra note 26, at 42; Rabe, supra note 26, at 315–17.
205. Notably, Congress did carry forward other prohibitions from earlier trademark laws, even
as it dropped the prohibition directed against unlawful businesses. For example, Congress’s 1905
trademark statute barred registration of immoral and scandalous marks. Trademark Law of 1905,
ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. The Lanham Act, of course, included similar prohibitions, which remained
in effect until they were invalidated by the Supreme Court. See sources cited supra note 42.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7).
207. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 n.8 (1951) (noting
rationale for § 33(b)(7) “was that ‘trade-marks have been misused . . . in connection with cartel
agreements’ ” (quoting 92 CONG. REC. 7872 (1946)), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
208. See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (refusing to find implied
remedy in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, because Congress had expressly included
that remedy in other statutes, thereby demonstrating “that it knew how to provide for the recovery
of cleanup costs”).
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federal law had become more pervasive and complex in the eight
decades between passage of the first federal trademark law in 1867 and
passage of the Lanham Act in 1947. Congress might have wanted to
spare the PTO the burden of determining whether trademark
applicants had complied with an ever-expanding array of federal
statutes and regulations. 209 Notably, the PTO has never addressed
section 2 in in its lawful use requirement decisions, nor has it ever
attempted to explain away why Congress omitted the express bar on
protection of marks used in unlawful business from the Lanham Act
after including it in prior trademark legislation, or why Congress
expressly targeted antitrust violations, but not violations of other
federal statutes, in formulating the defenses for trademark
infringement.
C. General Principles of Law
The PTO’s lawful use requirement has no basis in statutory text,
as just demonstrated. This Section shows that the requirement also has
no basis in more abstract, general principles of law.
1. Coahoma’s “Well-Established” Principle of Property Law
In Coahoma, the PTO based its new lawful use requirement
entirely on the notion that property rights could never be acquired by
unlawful means. 210 The PTO claimed this principle was so well
established in property law that “citation of authorities” was
“unnecessary.” 211
The PTO’s bald assertion, however, is just plain wrong. Contrary
to the PTO’s suggestion, it is widely recognized that one can acquire
valid property rights via unlawful acts. A property law scholar aptly
summarized the long-settled view in remarking that
[i]t is hornbook law that possession of a chattel, even without claim of title, gives the
possessor a superior right to the chattel against everyone but the true owner. . . . This
special property interest exists even in the most extreme case: that in which the possessor
has obtained the chattel by trespass, fraud, or theft. 212

Anderson v. Gouldberg aptly illustrates the fault in the PTO’s
premise. 213 In the famous case, plaintiff illegally cut logs on land that
209. See infra Section III.C.
210. See supra Section I.B.2.
211. Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 413, 418 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1957)
212. R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1986) (recognizing but also critiquing the principle).
213. 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892).
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was not his—i.e., he unlawfully converted the landowner’s property.
Plaintiff then took the logs to the defendant’s sawmill. Defendant, in
turn, stole the logs from plaintiff, probably figuring plaintiff would just
walk away. However, plaintiff sued defendant for conversion. The court
recognized that plaintiff was a thief, but it held that plaintiff still had
a property right in the logs and could sue defendant for conversion,
notwithstanding plaintiff’s wrongdoing in obtaining the logs. 214 Of
course, the court recognized that plaintiff’s rights were inferior to those
of the owner of the land from which plaintiff had taken the logs. 215 But
the court’s recognition of this limitation on plaintiff’s rights does not
detract from its holding that a wrongdoer (like plaintiff) can acquire
property rights vis-à-vis other parties with inferior claims (like
defendant).
In many respects, using a trademark is analogous to taking
possession of the mark. Just like the prior possessor of tangible property
holds a superior claim to that property vis-à-vis any subsequent
possessor, the prior user of a mark holds a superior claim to that mark
vis-à-vis any subsequent user thereof. 216 And if, in the case of tangible
property, it is of no consequence that the prior possessor took possession
via unlawful actions, 217 neither should it matter, for purposes of
trademark law, that a prior user made use of a mark in unlawful sales.
At the very least, contrary to the PTO’s declaration in Coahoma, there
is no universal principle of property law that would necessarily deny a
party’s claim to a mark based on wrongdoing associated with the use
thereof.
Ironically, the PTO itself confers analogous intellectual property
rights by issuing patents on goods that are plainly illegal. Although the
214. Id. at 637 (“When it is said that to maintain replevin the plaintiff’s possession must have
been lawful, it means merely that it must have been lawful as against the person who deprived
him of it; and possession is good title against all the world except those having a better title.”).
215. Id.
216. For a discussion of timing as a “bedrock principle” in both real and intellectual property,
see Dotan Oliar & James Y. Stern, Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual
Property, 99 B.U. L. REV. 395 (2019). See also id. at 428–29 (“Requiring ‘use’ of a trademark has a
fairly clear connection to possession. Possession is the basic precondition of use, and to use a
resource is almost axiomatically to possess it.”); Jake Linford, Trademark Owner As Adverse
Possessor: Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 703, 706 (2013)
(“[T]he parallels between acquiring real property through adverse possession and acquiring rights
to the exclusive use of trademarks are substantial . . . .”).
217. Anderson is but one of many authorities recognizing that rights may be acquired in
property via wrongful (e.g., illegal) acts. See also, e.g., United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 50 (2d
Cir. 2002) (recognizing “the well-settled common-law rule [is] that a thief in possession of stolen
goods has an ownership interest superior to the world at large, save one with a better claim to the
property” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Edwards,
903 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1990) (“It has long been a principle of common law that one in possession
of property has the right to keep it against all but those with a better title.”).
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courts once held that illegal inventions could not satisfy the utility
requirement for patents, 218 the Federal Circuit has recognized that this
restriction “has not been applied broadly in recent years.” 219 For
example, the PTO has issued dozens of patents on cannabis-related
inventions, notwithstanding the fact that the CSA bans the
manufacture, sale, and possession of these items. 220 Examples include
patents issued for potent cannabis plant strains (like “Rainbow
Gummeez”), improved methods for cultivating and harvesting cannabis
(including an energy efficient, automated farming system to “produce
cannabis for human consumption”), and concentrated marijuana
compounds to treat “ailments and diseases.” 221 The issuance of these
patents on unlawful goods is difficult to reconcile with the PTO’s
steadfast refusal to register trademarks on nearly identical marijuana
products, including plant strains and paraphernalia used to grow and
harvest cannabis. 222 When issuing patents, the PTO has looked askance
at possible violations of sundry other statutes, including the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 223 the same statute that
had been violated in Coahoma. Rather than scrutinizing whether an
invention could be made, sold, or even possessed lawfully, the PTO
leaves it to other agencies to decide how to enforce statutes that might
regulate the manufacture, possession, use, and distribution of the
invention 224—the very approach the PTO has flatly dismissed for
218. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817)
(noting courts will deny patents for inventions that are “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of society” such as “a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or
to facilitate private assassination”).
219. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also
Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., No. CA3-85-2573-D, 1988 WL 212501, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 28,
1988) (upholding patent for radar detector, even though it primarily served to thwart law
enforcement). For a discussion of these and other cases, see William J. McNichol, Jr., The New
Highwayman: Enforcement of U.S. Patents on Cannabis Products, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 24 (2019) (also suggesting some limits remain on issuing patents for unlawful goods).
220. McNichol, supra note 219, at 26 (noting that “at least 3000 cannabis patents have been
issued over the last 20 years,” ranging from strains of cannabis plant to methods for administering
the drug).
221. See USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html
(last
visited
Oct.
5,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/HH4Q-2EU6]. The database is searchable; for example, typing “rainbow
gummeez” into the query box will bring you to the patent information for that product.
222. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing TTAB marijuana lawful use cases).
To be sure, the analogy between patents and trademarks is imperfect, because a patent applicant
does not need to build or use its invention before seeking a patent. See generally John F. Duffy,
Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359 (2013) (discussing the patent
approach). This difference alone, however, does not reconcile the inconsistency in the PTO’s
consideration of illegality in the trademark and patent contexts.
223. See McNichol, supra note 219, at 37–38 (noting that PTO ignores FIFRA violations when
issuing patents).
224. Id. at 37:
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trademarks. 225 While courts might balk at enforcing patents on
unlawful goods, 226 that has not stopped the Agency from issuing patents
in the first instance.
Notably, and to its credit, the Federal Circuit, then called the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, did not endorse the PTO’s faulty
property law reasoning in Coahoma. Although it upheld the Agency’s
cancellation of registration, it did so on grounds totally unrelated to the
registrant’s apparent violation of FIFRA. Namely, it held that the
registrant never actually owned the mark in question and thus could
not have used that mark in commerce, lawfully or unlawfully. 227 The
court thus expressly demurred on the question whether trademark
rights could be acquired as a result of unlawful acts. 228
In any event, even if the PTO’s description of property law were
accurate, it has never explained how, exactly, this common law
principle became part of the Lanham Act’s statutory requirements for
registration. Importantly, Congress does not always incorporate
common law doctrines—even supposedly well-established ones—into
its statutory schemes. The Supreme Court has cautioned that the
“canon on imputing common-law meaning [to statutes] applies only
when Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning
at common law,” such as “larceny.” 229 The phrase “use in commerce”
simply does not fit the bill, as it was not borrowed from the common
law. Rather, the phrase was coined to serve a specific, jurisdictional
purpose, and Congress expressly defined each of its constituent terms
to serve that purpose (as discussed earlier).

Where the determination of the legality of the uses that may be made of an invention
is outside the expertise of the PTO, . . . the PTO will grant the patent, and defer to the
agency with specific expertise and authority in that area to determine whether it should
take enforcement action . . . .
225. In Satinine v. P.A.B., Member Lefkowitz took “exception to the suggestion” that the TTAB
should apply the lawful use requirement only when a violation had already been found “by a court
or agency having competent jurisdiction under the act in question.” Satinine Societa in Nome
Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209
U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 966 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (Lefkowitz, Member, concurring).
226. McNichol, supra note 219, at 40 (noting that “[e]ven if the U.S. PTO has the authority to
grant patents” on unlawful products, courts might still object to enforcing those patents). The
enforceability of cannabis patents is still unsettled. United Cannabis Corporation filed the first
cannabis patent infringement lawsuit in July 2018. However, the case was stayed before the court
could address enforceability when United Cannabis filed for bankruptcy. Matthew Bultman,
L.,
United
Cannabis
Suit
Stayed
After
Bankruptcy
Filing,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/ip-law/XD9RACTG000000 (last updated Apr.
22, 2020, 12:22 PM) [https://perma.cc/26FM-JGH3].
227. See supra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
228. Smith v. Coahoma Chem. Co., 264 F.2d 916, 920 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
229. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264–65 (2000).
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Simply put, the very first argument the PTO ever gave for its
lawful use requirement, and the only argument it gave in its most
influential lawful use decision, is both fundamentally flawed and
irrelevant for deciding whether the Lanham Act conditions registration
on compliance with other laws.
2. The “It Would Be Anomalous” Argument
In Stellar, the TTAB offered a slightly different formulation of
the argument espoused in Coahoma, this time citing a supposed
principle of statutory interpretation, rather than a doctrine of property
law, as the basis for its lawful use requirement. Namely, the TTAB
suggested it would be “anomalous” for an agency to confer rights under
one statute based on actions that violated another statute. 230 To avoid
this anomaly, the panel reasoned, the Lanham Act must be interpreted
to require compliance with other statutes as a condition for registering
a mark with the PTO. In fact, the TTAB later claimed it would be
“unthinkable” for the Agency to do otherwise—i.e., for the Agency to
ignore violations of other federal laws when administering the Lanham
Act’s trademark registration system. 231
However, like the ACP’s reasoning in Coahama, this argument
rests on a flawed premise. It would only be “anomalous” or
“unthinkable” for an agency to confer rights based on unlawful acts if
Congress never authorized agencies to do such a thing. But Congress
does, in fact, confer statutory rights on parties who violate other federal
statutes. 232 For example, undocumented immigrants may sue firms for
employment discrimination, workplace injuries, and other labor law
violations, notwithstanding the fact their employment and very
presence in the United States likely violates federal immigration
laws. 233 Similarly, purveyors of obscene material can obtain federal
copyright protection, notwithstanding their violation of obscenity
laws. 234 As discussed above, inventors can also obtain patents on
230. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing In re Stellar). The Ninth Circuit
parroted the same argument in CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., Inc., discussed supra, notes
151–153 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 110–113 (discussing Satinine v. P.A.B.).
232. See McElwain, supra note 26 (identifying examples of statutes that confer rights on
individuals who have acted unlawfully and suggesting that “if what [the In re Stellar panel] meant
by ‘anomalous’ is ‘unusual,’ then arguably this is not so”).
233. See, e.g., Employment Rights of Undocumented Workers, LEGAL AID AT WORK,
https://legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/undocumented-workers-employment-rights/ (last visited Oct.
20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3PQN-QPYU] (“With a few exceptions, undocumented workers enjoy
all of the legal rights and remedies provided by both federal and California law.”).
234. See, e.g., James R. Alexander, Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the
Obscenity Defense in Copyright, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209 (2013) (discussing cases).
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inventions that are illegal or serve illegal purposes. 235 Congress also
allows most criminals to deduct their business expenses when
calculating their federal tax liability. 236 To be sure, Congress made an
express exception for illegal drug dealers, explicitly barring them from
making certain deductions. 237 But that exception was only necessary
because there is no background presumption that law-breakers may not
claim deductions.
These examples demonstrate there is no general principle of
statutory construction requiring federal agencies to insist upon
compliance with all federal laws (not to mention state ones) when
administering the specific statute Congress has entrusted to them.
Indeed, as explained below in Part III, Congress has good reasons not
to burden agencies with the task of monitoring compliance with laws
far outside the scope of their expertise. Simply put, it would not be so
anomalous for the PTO “to accord recognition to the use of a mark when
the use relied upon was unlawful.” 238
Of course, claims based on plainly unlawful acts will rarely be
made before agencies, and for that reason, such claims may prove
“anomalous.” For example, it seems highly unlikely—perhaps even
“unthinkable” (to borrow the TTAB’s own terminology)—that anyone
would ever ask the PTO to register a mark on heroin. After all, doing so
would require an applicant to admit to a federal crime that triggers a
lengthy prison term, and one that is still being prosecuted vigorously. 239
But the fact that a claim will seldom be asserted is no reason, by itself,
to reject it. Otherwise, all novel legal claims could be dismissed out-ofhand on that basis alone.
3. The Clean Hands Doctrine
The lawful use requirement has also been tenuously linked to
another general principle of law, the clean hands doctrine. As noted
above, this equitable doctrine bars recovery for claims directly tainted
by fraud or other intentional wrongs. 240 It is premised on the idea that
“the integrity of the judiciary is compromised when courts assent to,
entertain, or even hear petitions and pleadings predicated on or
235. See supra notes 218–226 and accompanying text.
236. See Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523, 530–
34 (2014) (discussing tax rules for businesses).
237. Id. at 526 (discussing history behind I.R.C. § 280E).
238. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 967 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (Kera, Member,
concurring).
239. See infra notes 358–360 and accompanying text.
240. See sources cited supra notes 160–161.
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implicated by the claimant’s own wrongdoing.” 241 Commentators have
speculated that the courts may have based the nascent unlawful use
defense on a previously recognized clean hands defense to trademark
infringement. 242
The clean hands doctrine, however, bears little resemblance to
the lawful use requirement, and thus provides little support for the
PTO’s requirement. 243 To begin, the clean hands doctrine generally
“looks at the intent (good faith or bad faith) of the [party], whereas
unlawful use does not.” 244 The Ninth Circuit, one of only two circuits to
have recognized an unlawful use defense against trademark
infringement, emphasizes that “[b]ad intent is the essence of the
defense of unclean hands.” 245 In contrast, the lawful use requirement
has no mens rea element, other than that which might be required by
the law governing the mark owner’s sales. But because many federal
laws can be violated through mere negligence or even ignorance (i.e.,
unknowingly), the lawful use requirement sanctions much wrongdoing
the clean hands doctrine does not consider sanctionable. 246
Furthermore, in trademark infringement actions, clean hands
typically applies to wrongdoing that involves consumer deception,
whereas the lawful use requirement, again, does not. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, insists that “[t]o show that a trademark plaintiff’s conduct
is inequitable, defendant must show that plaintiff used the trademark
to deceive consumers.” 247 Requiring a showing of consumer deception
helps counteract the defense’s propensity to stoke consumer confusion.
After all, the defense allows infringement to go unpunished, even
though, by definition, infringement involves consumer confusion. 248 The
lawful use requirement, however, has no necessary link to consumer
confusion. While it may have once been applied mostly to labeling
violations, the PTO now applies the requirement to violations of a broad
array of laws that do not threaten consumer deception or confusion. 249

241. Herstein, supra note 161, at 177.
242. See sources cited supra note 165.
243. Indeed, it is revealing that the TTAB itself has never mentioned the clean hands doctrine
by name in any lawful use decision.
244. Rabe, supra note 26, at 333.
245. Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 173 (9th Cir. 1989).
246. See infra Section III.B (discussing how lawful use requirement can unfairly punish mark
owners).
247. Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 870 (9th Cir. 2002). The
lawful use requirement departs from the clean hands doctrine in other ways as well. See, e.g.,
Cooper, supra note 26, at 55 (noting that lawful use requirement “is considerably more stringent”
because it does not allow for purgation of misconduct).
248. See The Besmirched Plaintiff, supra note 26, at 117–22.
249. See infra Section III.A.
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The Prohibition-era case Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Cohen
illuminates the sharp contrast between the clean hands doctrine and
today’s lawful use requirement. 250 Because it could no longer sell
BUDWEISER beer during Prohibition, Anheuser-Busch instead began
selling barley malt syrup under its famous beer mark. 251 When the
defendant began selling its own barley malt syrup using the
conspicuously similar name BUDD-WISE, Anheuser-Busch naturally
sued for trademark infringement. In response, the defendant raised the
clean hands defense, 252 credibly accusing Anheuser-Busch of marketing
BUDWEISER barley malt syrup “primarily for the manufacture of
intoxicating home-brew beer,” in plain violation of federal and state
prohibition laws. 253 Had the defendant petitioned the PTO for
cancellation of the BUDWEISER mark under today’s lawful use
requirement, the defendant likely would have prevailed in the dispute
(no more “Dilly Dilly”). 254 In reality, however, the Anheuser-Busch court
applied the clean hands defense, and it rejected that defense because
Anheuser-Busch’s “unlawful conduct” was “a collateral issue” in the
infringement lawsuit. 255 In a critical passage stressing the limits to the
clean hands doctrine, the court warned that “[u]nlawful use of a trademark can give no license to the general public to infringe that trademark, regardless of whether the infringement be in connection with
legitimate or unlawful trade.” 256 In other words, the clean hands
doctrine does not foreclose recovery for all unlawful conduct. 257 To the
extent the PTO (or the courts) have equated unlawful use with unclean
hands, they have forgotten these limitations on the equitable
doctrine. 258
The lawful use requirement is also unnecessary to protect the
integrity of the PTO and thus does not serve the primary purpose of the
clean hands doctrine. In the first place, there is no reason to think that
250. 37 F.2d 393 (D. Md. 1930).
251. Id. at 394.
252. The defendant cited the Trademark Law of 1905’s prohibition on suits by “unlawful
businesses,” but the court interpreted that statutory provision as codifying the “long-established
equitable principle” of clean hands. Id. at 395.
253. Id.
254. The PTO has, after all, denied registration of all marks used on marijuana products
because the sale of those products is unlawful today—just like the sale of beer was unlawful during
Prohibition.
255. 37 F.2d at 395.
256. Id. The court proceeded to suggest that “[i]f the plaintiff is in fact violating the criminal
law, he can be punished in the proper forum”—i.e., not in a trademark infringement lawsuit. Id.
257. Id.
258. See MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 19:123 (“By denying common law rights [on the basis of
unlawful use], the Ninth Circuit [in CreAgri] was in fact expanding the equitable doctrine of
unclean hands, although it did not seem to realize this.”).
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registering a mark used in unlawful sales would impugn the PTO’s
integrity. 259 In registering a mark, the PTO plays a very limited and
passive role in the mark owner’s business affairs, far more limited than
that of, say, a bankruptcy trustee, who may be called upon to operate a
business and thus conduct the business’s unlawful sales. 260 Even a
court asked to award damages for infringement of a mark used in
unlawful commerce does not thereby somehow become an accomplice to
the mark owner’s misdeeds. In fact, courts commonly allow recovery in
very similar cases involving claims based on wrongful acts, including
theft. 261 In nearly identical circumstances, when the PTO objected to
registering disparaging marks (like THE SLANTS, for an Asian
American dance rock band), the Supreme Court dismissed the Agency’s
integrity concern out-of-hand, reasoning that “registration does not
constitute [the Agency’s] approval of a mark” and is not perceived by
the public as such. 262
Even more fundamentally, the PTO has no authority to impose
new registration requirements based on equitable principles. In other
words, the Lanham Act does not permit the Agency to add “clean hands”
to the list of requirements for registration expressly enumerated by
section 1, or to add “unclean hands” to section 2’s expressly enumerated
list of the cognizable grounds for refusing registration. Nor do agencies
like the PTO have any inherent authority to craft policy based upon
equitable principles like the clean hands doctrine. 263 In fact, giving the
PTO leeway to rewrite the statutory requirements for trademark
259. The TTAB has raised this concern in only a single lawful use decision. The Board
dismissed a cancellation petition because it found the petitioner had used its own, unregistered
mark to “promote” and “assist” its sales of engine modification kits in violation of California’s
Vehicle Code. Geraghty Dyno-Tuned Prods., Inc. v. Clayton Mfg. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 508, 512
(T.T.A.B. 1976). The Board remarked that it would be “unthinkable to help petitioner to
obtain . . . valuable [trademark] rights when the very trademark property that would be protected
is an essential ingredient in the inducing, if not outright commission, of unlawful acts.” Id.
(emphasis added).
260. The integrity objection thus appears more credible in the bankruptcy setting, where it
has been invoked to deny bankruptcy protections for unlawful businesses. See, e.g., Steven J.
Boyajian, Just Say No to Drugs?: Creditors Not Getting a Fair Shake When Marijuana-Related
Cases Are Dismissed, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24 (2017) (discussing application of clean hands
principles to bankruptcy filings by marijuana businesses).
261. For example, in Payne v. TK Auto Wholesalers, the court allowed a thief to recover the
$1,300 cash down payment he had made to a car dealer even though the thief had been convicted
of stealing the cash and committing fraud in the attempted purchase of the car. 911 A.2d 747, 751–
52 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
262. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017); id. at 1760 (noting that “there is no evidence
that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal Government”).
263. Cf. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 280–81 (recognizing that while agencies may consult
equitable principles when making individual enforcement decisions, they do not have authority to
craft broader policies based on those same principles).
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registration based on amorphous equitable principles like clean hands
would effectively “dissolve” the limits Congress has imposed on the
Agency’s substantive rulemaking authority. 264 Courts might be
differently situated, because the Lanham Act gives them express
statutory authority to impose some equitable defenses in trademark
infringement litigation 265—but the PTO, of course, is not a court.
D. The PTO’s Limited Rulemaking Authority
The foregoing analysis of the Lanham Act’s text demonstrates
that, rather than being imposed by Congress, the lawful use
requirement was instead created by the PTO. This Section explains why
the PTO lacks the power to impose requirements for registration not
found in the Lanham Act. It completes the task of demonstrating that
the PTO, in imposing this additional requirement for registration, has
exceeded its statutory authority.
The Lanham Act delegates only limited rulemaking authority to
the PTO. In pertinent part, section 41 of the statute gives the PTO
authority to “make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of proceedings.” 266 The language of section 41 is widely
understood as conferring the power to make procedural rules—e.g., to
specify the deadlines for making filings in proceedings, but not
substantive ones—i.e., rules that alter the rights and duties specified
by the Lanham Act. 267 Importantly, section 41 is the only provision of
264. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434 (1999) (“Ex ante legal constraints dissolve as agencies gain
discretion to waive rules, make exceptions to them, or simply decline to enforce them in
appropriate circumstances.”). The statutory limits on the PTO’s power to craft substantive
trademark rules are discussed infra in Section II.D.
265. Section 33 of the Lanham Act provides that registration of a mark “shall not
preclude . . . any legal or equitable defense . . . which might have been asserted if such mark had
not been registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). Section 33(b)(9) also makes “equitable principles,
including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence” available as defenses to infringement of
incontestable marks—i.e., marks that have been used continuously for five years post-registration.
Id. § 1115(b)(9). The latter provision was added by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next
Frontier?, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 434 (2017) (discussing the requirements for and defenses to
incontestability). Although the courts’ authority is beyond the scope of this Article, Part III
suggests that courts may have overstepped the bounds of their statutory authority by recognizing
a broad unlawful use defense to infringement.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (emphasis added).
267. See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt, Beware the Trademark Echo Chamber: Why Federal
Courts Should Not Defer to USPTO Decisions, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 643, 652–53 (2018) (noting
that the PTO “has only procedural authority” and not “substantive rule-making authority”
regarding trademarks); Wasserman, supra note 65, at 1534 (acknowledging that the PTO “does
not possess the power to issue binding rules that carry the force of law on the core issues of
trademark law”).
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the Lanham Act conferring relevant rulemaking authority on the PTO,
and the only provision the Agency has ever cited to support
promulgation of Rules 100.141 and 2.69, i.e., the Rules that include a
lawful use requirement. 268
The lawful use requirement is a substantive requirement, not a
procedural rule. By narrowing the express statutory definition of “use”
or “commerce,” the requirement alters the rights and duties of parties
seeking registration of marks. 269 For this reason, the requirement
cannot be sustained by section 41. In other words, the PTO cannot
impose this requirement of its own accord.
Lacking any plausible textual argument for its requirement, the
PTO has instead resorted to making policy arguments for conditioning
registration on compliance with other laws. For example, it has
suggested that the requirement (somehow) helps protect consumers
from deception. In other words, the PTO has resorted to claiming that
the lawful use requirement is a prudent policy, even if it is not
necessarily one that Congress devised. The Ninth Circuit in CreAgri
even referred to the lawful use requirement as the “PTO’s policy,” not a
congressional mandate. But lacking any independent statutory
authority to change the substance of federal trademark law, the PTO’s
policy-based justifications for the lawful use requirement are misplaced
(not to mention misguided, for the reasons discussed below). Indeed, the
TTAB has rebuked private parties for making similar appeals to policy
considerations when they have challenged the lawful use requirement.
For example, in response to one applicant’s claim that the lawful use
requirement “creates consumer confusion, allows for dilution of brand
and quality, and opens the Applicant up to infringement, which is
contrary to the purpose and intent of the [Lanham] Act,” the TTAB
retorted that these arguments raised “policy issues that are beyond our
jurisdiction over issues of trademark registrability.” 270 The TTAB failed
to grasp the inconsistency in its position and the ramifications of its
statement. In seeking to justify its lawful use requirement on policy
arguments rather than textual ones, the TTAB has overstepped the

268. The Agency did not cite any statutory provision when it first promulgated Rule 100.141
in 1947. 12 Fed. Reg. 3962 (June 17, 1947). However, when the Agency amended Rule 100.141 (to
add lard), and when it subsequently replaced Rule 100.141 with Rule 2.69 (and when it later made
cosmetic modifications thereto), it cited only to section 41 of the Latham Act. See 12 Fed. Reg.
6640, 6641 (Nov. 1, 1949); 54 Fed. Reg. 37562, 37588 (Sept. 11, 1989).
269. Even the Agency’s Rule 2.69, which cagily authorizes examiners only “to make [an]
appropriate inquiry as to compliance,” is a substantive rule, as the TTAB has readily
acknowledged. See supra note 82 (discussing In re Stellar).
270. In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1568, 1571–72 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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limits on its authority. It has arrogated to itself the power to change the
express terms of the Lanham Act as it deems fit.
E. Summary
The Lanham Act neither expressly nor implicitly demands
compliance with other statutes to register a mark. In conditioning
registration on such compliance, the PTO has ignored the plain text of
the Lanham Act and the twin purposes served by its “use in commerce”
requirement. The Agency has also ignored limits on its authority to
refuse registration for any reason not expressly enumerated in the
statute. 271 While Congress had expressly prohibited protection of marks
used in unlawful businesses in every previous trademark statute, it
noticeably dropped that prohibition from the text of the Lanham Act.
The Agency’s only textual argument for the requirement, made more
than three decades after the statute was enacted, contradicts one of the
most basic canons of statutory interpretation and misconstrues the
settled meaning of statutory terms. The PTO has also misconstrued
general principles of law, which do not support denying all relief to
wrongdoers, and, in any event, have not been incorporated wholesale
into the Lanham Act. For these reasons, the PTO’s lawful use
requirement is, ironically, unlawful.
III. UNWISE: TRADEMARK LAW SHOULD NOT DEMAND LAWFUL USE
This Part mounts the second of two fundamental challenges to
the lawful use requirement. It demonstrates that the requirement is an
unnecessary, counterproductive, and costly addition to federal
trademark policy. This Part thus explains why decisionmakers today
should reject the lawful use requirement, even assuming they have the
authority to impose it. But illuminating why the requirement is bad
trademark policy also helps explain why Congress would not have
wanted the PTO to condition registration on compliance with
nontrademark laws, thus bolstering the claim made in Part II that
there is no statutory basis for the lawful use requirement.
The first two Sections begin by examining the relationship
between the lawful use requirement and the two primary purposes
behind the Lanham Act: protecting consumers from deception and
promoting fair competition. Section A demonstrates that the
requirement does not necessarily protect consumers, and may, in fact,
271. Cf. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017) (noting that, unless one of the bans
specifically enumerated in section 2 applies, a trademark examiner “does not inquire whether any
viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government policy”).
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stoke deception by inviting infringement of marks with which
consumers are familiar. Section B then explains why application of the
lawful use requirement does not promote fair competition either.
Sections C and D show that the lawful use requirement imposes
substantial costs on the trademark registration system. Section C
highlights the complicated substantive and procedural questions raised
by the requirement. Addressing these questions raises the cost of
trademark proceedings. Section D also reveals that the TTAB has
struggled to apply the requirement consistently across cases, in part
because the Board has failed to clearly define the limitations discussed
in Section I.B.2. The arbitrariness in the Board’s decisions constitutes
another “cost” of its lawful use requirement.
Finally, Section E considers the overlooked toll the requirement
takes on the enforcement of other laws besides the Lanham Act. It
suggests that the requirement upsets the careful schemes Congress has
designed for enforcement of various nontrademark laws.
For these reasons, the lawful use requirement is not only
unauthorized, but unwise.
A. Unsafe
Perhaps the foremost purpose of the Lanham Act, and of
trademark law more generally, is to protect consumers from confusion
and deception by helping them to “identify goods and services that they
wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid.” 272 To that end,
the statute proscribes “the deceptive and misleading use of marks” 273—
in other words, use that is likely to cause confusion among consumers.
The TTAB has cryptically implied that its lawful use
requirement serves this core consumer protection purpose. In Satinine,
as discussed above, Board Member Lefkowitz recited the Lanham Act’s
272. Id. at 1751; see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 2020, 2021 (2005) (“The consumer, we are led to believe, is the measure of all things in
trademark law.”); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2014) (observing that trademark law “enable[s]
consumer decisionmaking” by combatting trademark use “that causes consumer confusion about
the origins of goods or services”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62
STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) (recognizing that, “[w]ith some significant exceptions, the basic rule
of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number
of consumers and not otherwise”); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“It would be difficult to overstate the level of
consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to
improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search
costs.”). Although scholars disagree about the relative priority of different trademark goals, there
is no need to wade into that debate here because the lawful use requirement serves none of the
goals of trademark law.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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purpose of “making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks,” immediately before remarking that “[i]t is recognized that
trademark rights cannot accrue from an unlawful use of a mark in
commerce.” 274 Neither Member Lefkowitz nor anyone else with the PTO
has ever explained exactly how the lawful use requirement helps
prevent consumer confusion. But the claim may rest on either (or both)
of two faulty assumptions.
First, Member Lefkowitz may have assumed that the
requirement would only apply to violations of labeling requirements,
which at least share the Lanham Act’s purpose of protecting consumers.
Recall that Rule 100.141 applied only to violations of labeling
requirements, and the Agency’s early decisions applying the broader
Rule 2.69 commonly (though not invariably) involved labeling
violations. 275
However, even if it were only triggered by labeling violations,
the lawful use requirement still would not necessarily contribute
anything to protecting consumers. As Member Rice surmised in
Satinine, the violation of a labeling law means that “the label may be
deceptive or misleading,” but it “does not mean that the mark applied
to the goods is being used in a deceptive or misleading manner.” 276 Put
another way, a mark does not necessarily contribute to consumer
confusion just because it is used on a product that is mislabeled or
otherwise unlawful. It thus follows that refusing registration of the
mark does not necessarily help combat consumer confusion.
Furthermore, if the mark itself is misleading or deceptive, section 2(d)
expressly authorizes the PTO to refuse registration of the mark, 277
thereby making an implied lawful use requirement unnecessary for this
purpose.
Anyway, the lawful use requirement has not stayed confined to
labeling violations. As discussed previously, the TTAB has applied the
requirement to violations of a broad array of laws, including many that
regulate products or services rather than just the labels used thereon,
and laws which have little, if anything, to do with protecting consumers
from confusion or deception. 278 Consider the CSA, the federal statute
274. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 966 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (Lefkowitz, Member,
concurring). Member Lefkowitz’s concurring opinion in Satinine is the only decision I have found
in which the TTAB has suggested that the lawful use requirement might help protect consumers.
275. See supra Section I.B.
276. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 967 n.2; see also McElwain, supra note 26 (making similar
point).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (authorizing the PTO to refuse registration of a mark that is likely
“to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
278. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text.
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that prohibits the manufacture, sale, and possession of marijuana. 279
The sale of marijuana plainly violates the CSA, and, for this reason
alone, the TTAB has repeatedly refused to register any marks used on
products containing marijuana. 280 But sales of marijuana products in
violation of the CSA do not necessarily dupe consumers about the
quality, legality, safety, etc. of the drug. In other words, even if
consumers know exactly what they are getting, the sale of marijuana is
still unlawful.
The claim that the lawful use requirement combats consumer
deception might rest on a second faulty assumption, namely, the notion
that a trademark, or more specifically, the registration thereof, confers
legitimacy on the product on which the mark is used. In other words,
the TTAB might believe that slapping a registered trademark on a
product (like marijuana) would fool consumers into believing that the
product itself was safe, effective, lawful, etc.
But registration of a trademark does not legitimize the goods on
which the mark is used. As one prominent commentator has pointedly
noted, “[t]he government, by registering a mark, does not thereby give
its approval or imprimatur to the propriety, suitableness, or
tastefulness of the mark or of the suitability or quality of the goods or
services with which it is used.” 281 Nor do consumers understand
trademark registration to constitute endorsement of the quality, safety,
utility, or legality of the product on which the mark is used. For
example, consumers are not likely to view the ® symbol to signify that
PABST BLUE RIBBON is a good beer, that ARBY’S Roast Beef is a
healthy sandwich, or that THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY has a good
football team.
In fact, the lawful use requirement seems more likely to cause
consumer confusion than to dispel it. The requirement strips a senior
user of its priority over a mark, thereby enabling another party to use

279. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-844.
280. See, e.g., In re PharmaCann LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1122 (T.T.A.B. 2017)
(PHARMACANN for retail marijuana shop); In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1568 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (JUJU JOINTS for smokeless marijuana or cannabis vaporizer apparatus); In re Ultra
Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 WL 7385764 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016) (ULTRA TRIMMER
for agricultural trimming machine); In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1350 (T.T.A.B.
2016) (HERBAL ACCESS for retail marijuana shop). The PTO has refused an even larger number
of marks used on marijuana products through Office Actions that were never appealed to the
TTAB. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88978250 (Office Action, July 29, 2020)
(ORVA for medical product containing CBD).
281. MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 19:3.50; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017)
(making the related point that “registration does not constitute approval of a mark”).
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the mark on its own products even when such use would confuse
consumers. 282
The marijuana market provides a timely example. Several statelicensed marijuana suppliers have already built loyal brand
followings. 283 To a limited extent, those companies can even defend
their marks against infringement by relying on state trademark law,
which, unlike federal law, does offer protection for trademarks used on
marijuana products. 284 But the protections afforded by state trademark
law are limited. 285 Most importantly for present purposes, any rights
conferred by state trademark law extend only to the state’s own borders.
As a result, a licensed marijuana firm operating in one state cannot
prevent black marketeers or even other licensed marijuana firms from
using its marks in another state. For obvious reasons, the lack of
national trademark protection for marijuana brands puts marijuana
consumers at risk. After all, they may not understand that two
marijuana products bearing similar or even identical marks in two
different states are not necessarily made by the same company and may
have very different characteristics. 286 To use an example from another
industry, imagine if the BUDWEISER beer you drank in New York
contained five percent alcohol by volume (“ABV”), but the BUDWEISER
you drank next door in New Jersey had fifteen percent ABV.
The risk to consumer welfare is not limited to gray markets like
marijuana. In almost any industry, a mark owner could be refused
registration, or have its registration cancelled by the PTO, because the
owner, perhaps unwittingly, violated some federal (or even state) law

282. See, e.g., Astrachan, supra note 26, at 266–67 (“If a mark is not enforceable, its owner
cannot prevent a competitor from adopting a similar mark for use on similar goods and services
and prevent the use of that mark to attract customers, some of whom might be searching for the
goods or services produced by the owner of the non-enforceable, but senior mark.”); Cooper, supra
note 26, at 53 (noting that “noncompliance with federal law may transform a senior user into a
junior user”).
283. See supra note 22.
284. See California Cannabis Trademarks Could Get a Legislative Boost, HARRIS BRICKEN:
CANNA L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2019), https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/california-cannabistrademarks-could-get-a-legislative-boost/ [https://perma.cc/9SX8-HVPD].
285. See Russell W. Jacobs, Cannabis Trademarks: A State Registration Consortium Solution,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 159, 167–69 (2017) (discussing limitations); see also Sam Crocker,
Cultivating a Better Strain of Trademark Law: Why the Unlawful Uses Doctrine Should Be
Modified for State-Legal Marijuana-Related Marks, 44 J. CORP. L. 591, 598 (2019) (discussing the
same limitations).
286. See Jacobs, supra note 285, at 162 (“[I]f a marijuana dispensary opens in Truckee,
California under the service mark BAKED TAHOE and a competitor opens another BAKED
TAHOE dispensary thirty miles away in Reno, Nevada, a customer could reasonably assume that
the dispensaries operated under common ownership.”); see also Crocker, supra note 285, at 597
(suggesting that applying lawful use requirement to marijuana industry “undercuts the primary
purpose of trademark law: the prevention of consumer confusion”).
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when selling its goods. 287 Importantly, refusal or cancellation can
happen years after a mark is first used, and years after the mark is first
registered 288—in other words, long after the mark has become
associated with a particular vendor in the minds of consumers.
In short, by denying mark owners the ability to safeguard their
marks from infringement by other firms, the lawful use requirement
undermines the Lanham Act’s purpose of helping consumers to identify
the source of goods and services they buy. As one commentator has aptly
put it, “[r]efusing to recognize trademarks used in unlawful commerce
punishes the consumer for the sins of the manufacturer.” 289
B. Unfair
The Lanham Act is also intended to promote fair competition by
“protect[ing] producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by
competitors.” 290 To this end, the statute proscribes the infringing use of
a mark, and thereby “helps assure a producer that it (and not an
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product.” 291
In CreAgri, the Ninth Circuit briefly suggested that the lawful
use requirement serves this fair competition purpose. As noted above,
the court asserted that, “as a policy matter, to give trademark priority
to a seller who rushes to market without taking care to carefully comply
with the relevant regulations would be to reward the hasty at the
expense of the diligent.” 292 Although the court did not elaborate on the
argument, it appears to suggest that a mark owner who breaks the law
while using its mark has necessarily gained an unfair advantage over
more scrupulous rivals, and thus, does not deserve the rights normally
accorded by federal trademark law.
287. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text (listing a sampling of the statutes that have
triggered the lawful use requirement).
288. The Lanham Act gives parties five years from the date of registration to petition to cancel
a mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(1); see, e.g., Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 413, 418
(Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1957) (cancelling registration three years after petition filed, and almost seven
years after registration was issued). Even after this five-year period has expired, however, parties
may still challenge a mark as “abandoned” if it has not been used lawfully for any three-year
period. See Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (recognizing mark may be
considered “abandoned” if used unlawfully).
289. McElwain, supra note 26.
290. McKenna, supra note 272, at 1841; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating Congress’s intent
“to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition”).
291. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
292. CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added).
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Upon closer examination, however, it is far from clear that the
lawful use requirement promotes fairness, for four main reasons. First,
a trademark applicant does not necessarily gain an unfair competitive
advantage when it acquires trademark priority through the unlawful
sale of a product. Although the CreAgri case involved a trademark
infringement suit between rivals using similar marks, the lawful use
requirement is not restricted to inter partes disputes. Recall that the
PTO authorizes its trademark examiners to conduct ex parte
investigations into the lawfulness of the commerce in which a mark has
been used. Indeed, in many cases, the PTO has refused registration on
the basis of such investigations, even when no one besides a trademark
examiner has objected to the applicant’s violation and no competitive
harm is apparent. 293 In Stellar, for example, the trademark examiner
refused to register the mark JETFRESH after they discovered that the
applicant had failed to list the weight on each package of its breath
fresheners, as apparently required by the FDCA. 294 The TTAB upheld
the refusal, even though no rival had complained and there was no
other indication that any rival had been disadvantaged by the
applicant’s violation of the FDCA. 295 (While some mark owners might
be able to keep their priority over a mark by correcting their violations,
this is not always possible, both because another firm might start using
the same mark before the correction can be made, and because some
violations are not so easily corrected (think of marijuana vendors).)
Second, even when a rival does object to a mark owner’s
transgression (as in CreAgri), it does not necessarily follow that the
mark owner gained some unfair advantage through that transgression.
For one thing, the mark owner may have unwittingly violated federal
law governing the sale of its product. A mark owner may violate many
federal regulations, like the FDCA labeling requirement at issue in

293. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 490, 491 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (refusing registration
because of suspected FDCA labeling violation discovered by examiner).
294. In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
295. The TTAB has occasionally discouraged examiners from conducting overzealous
investigations into compliance with nontrademark laws. In re Garden of Eatin’ Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q.
(BL) 355, 357 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (disapproving examiner’s request for FDA opinion regarding legality
of applicant’s sales, but still upholding examiner’s refusal to register mark). Nonetheless,
trademark examiners commonly gather and consider evidence not contained in the trademark
application to determine whether applicants’ sales were lawful. E.g., TMEP, supra note 60, § 907
(instructing that if “there is extrinsic evidence indicating that the goods or services do not, in fact,
comply with federal law, the examining attorney must refuse registration”); In re Ultra Trimmer,
L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 WL 7385764, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016) (holding that even “if the
identification of goods or services in an application does not reveal a per se violation of the
CSA . . . extrinsic evidence may be used to show such a violation”).
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CreAgri, without being “hasty.” 296 Importantly, the PTO does not
require any party, including its own trademark examiners, to
demonstrate or even allege that a mark owner’s violation of the lawful
use requirement was strategic, malicious, or otherwise morally
blameworthy.
Third, in any event, even if a mark owner’s violation is somehow
blameworthy, it is still not clear why the PTO needs to levy trademark
sanctions on that violation. After all, every statute that triggers the
lawful use requirement provides its own, carefully calibrated set of
sanctions and remedies for violations. For example, the FDCA
threatens penalties ranging from warnings to steep fines, seizures, and
even prison sentences for violations of that statute. 297 Given the
availability of these penalties, the PTO does not need to levy its own
sanctions to level the competitive playing field. Indeed, depriving mark
owners of their trademark rights because of violations of nontrademark
laws can prove unduly harsh, even “Draconian,” as the PTO itself has
recognized. 298 Notwithstanding PTO efforts to soften the doctrine, it
remains a very blunt instrument for rebalancing any “unfair”
advantage a mark owner might have gained by violating some
nontrademark statute. Consider that a party could lose its trademark
right for transgressions that range from failing to display the weight of
individual mouthwash packets to selling high-potency marijuana.
Fourth, in inter partes disputes, the party that gains from the
lawful use requirement is not necessarily “innocent” of wrongdoing, as
the CreAgri court appears to assume. The requirement can be raised as
a defense by parties who have knowingly and intentionally infringed a
mark to illegitimately divert sales from the mark’s owner. 299 In fact,
some courts have allowed defendants to raise the defense when even
they committed the same wrongdoing of which they accuse the mark’s
owner. In Kratom Lab, Inc. v. Mancini, for example, the inventor of
synthetic marijuana, sold under the registered mark MR. NICE GUY,
sued a rival for infringement. 300 The defendant also sold synthetic
marijuana, allegedly using plaintiff’s brand name to take advantage of
296. The District Court (but not the Ninth Circuit) acknowledged as much in CreAgri, when it
wrote that while “CreAgri argues there is no evidence it intended to make a false statement on its
labels[, t]he statute prohibiting misbranding of food . . . does not have a scienter requirement.”
CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., No. 03-3216, 2005 WL 181886, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2005), aff’d sub nom. CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2007).
297. 21 U.S.C. § 333.
298. Gen. Mills Inc. v. Health Valley Foods, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1270, 1273 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
299. As Professor McCarthy has remarked, the lawful use requirement “has turned federal
trademark litigation into an infringer’s search for labeling or other administrative missteps by the
trademark owner.” MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 19:123.
300. No. 11-80987-CIV, 2013 WL 3927838, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2013).
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the product’s popularity. The defendant, however, asserted the
unlawful use defense, arguing that the sale of synthetic marijuana was
unlawful. The court agreed, and it dismissed the plaintiff’s
infringement claims on that ground. 301 It held that “[w]hether
Defendants profited from using Kratom Lab’s fraudulently obtained
trademark is irrelevant because the trademark was fraudulently
obtained.” 302
C. Burdensome
The lawful use requirement not only undermines the core
purposes of the Lanham Act, it also exacts a heavy toll on the trademark
system. The requirement greatly increases the complexity of
determining eligibility for registration and thereby adds to the costs of
trademark proceedings. Whenever the requirement is raised, it forces
the PTO and the parties involved to delve into a diverse array of
complicated federal statutes, just to determine whether the sale or
transportation of some trademarked good regulated by one of those
statutes was lawful.
Consider just a few of the tricky legal and factual questions the
TTAB has had to resolve while applying the lawful use requirement.
Does a “therapeutic skin care preparation” constitute a “medicine” or
“drug,” requiring FDA approval for sale? 303 Similarly, does an applicant
need the FDA’s approval to sell a ventilator? What if the buyer only
intended to “test” the device, but not use it to treat patients? 304 Is
shampoo “soap,” for purposes of the FDCA? 305 Does the California
Business and Professions Code prohibit using a fictitious name on a
medical practice, at least without a fictitious name permit? 306 Does an
applicant’s use of the mark HERE’S JOHNNY on portable toilets
301. Id.
302. Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted) (holding that plaintiff should have informed PTO that DEA
had banned sale of synthetic marijuana while its registration application was still pending); see
also Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLC, 262 F. Supp. 3d 605, 606–07 (N.D.
Ill. 2017) (allowing defendant to raise unlawful use defense against infringement suit,
notwithstanding allegations that defendant had also violated CSA’s ban on sale of drug
paraphernalia); Purple Heart Patient Ctr., Inc. v. Mil. Ord. of the Purple Heart of the U.S. of Am.,
Inc., No. C 13–00902, 2014 WL 572366, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) (allowing medical
marijuana dispensary to raise tenuous unlawful use defense against infringement suit,
notwithstanding dispensary’s blatant violation of the CSA).
303. See Sköld v. Galderma Lab’ys, Inc., No. 9205289, 2012 WL 5902083, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Nov.
8, 2012).
304. See Automedx, Inc. v. Artivent Corp., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1976 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
305. See Clorox Co. v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 850 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
306. See Facial Aesthetic Ctr. of Excellence Grp., Inc., v. Stewart Wang, M.D., Inc., No.
92044775, 2006 WL 3296210, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2006).
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violate opposer’s state law right of publicity? 307 Has an applicant sold
its isobutyl nitrites for human consumption, in violation of the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, or as a lawful all-purpose cleaner? 308 Does the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 bar a commercial bank from offering
insurance brokerage services? 309 Does the failure to list the country of
origin on cosmetics violate the Tariff Act of 1930? 310 Does the Fair
Labeling and Packaging Act apply to sales of cosmetics meant for
professional use, rather than consumer use? 311 Does the sale of
marijuana violate the lawful use requirement when the sale is
authorized by state law? 312 What if the Department of Justice suggests
it will not prosecute those sales? 313 What if Congress has expressly
barred such prosecutions? 314 Federal statutes provide an almost
inexhaustible supply of such vexing questions.
In addition to substantive questions like these, the lawful use
requirement has also spawned a host of knotty procedural questions. In
ex parte cases, for example, how zealously may a trademark examiner
investigate their suspicions that an applicant has violated some
nontrademark law? May the examiner look at materials not submitted
with the application, such as the applicant’s website? 315 May the
examiner consult with the federal agency responsible for enforcing the
statute at issue? 316 Does the party challenging a mark bear the burden
of demonstrating use was unlawful, or does the mark owner bear the

307. See John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1942 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
308. See AFAB Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Pac-West Distrib. NV LLC, No. 91224268, 2016 WL
2866564, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May 4, 2016).
309. See E.W. Bank Co. v. Plubell Firm LLC, No. 92053712, 2016 WL 5219824, at *14 (T.T.A.B.
Sept. 8, 2016).
310. See Topiclear, Inc. v. K & N Distribs., No. 9206292, 2017 WL 3718301, at *1 (T.T.A.B.
Feb. 27, 2017).
311. See Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et
Appareils de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
312. See In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
313. See In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1568 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
314. See In re PharmaCann LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1122 (T.T.A.B. 2017).
315. E.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (noting that TTAB had visited
registrant’s website to help determine whether FUCT mark for jeans was “immoral” or
“scandalous”); In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) at 1352–53 (upholding examiner’s refusal
to register mark, after examiner reviewed applicant’s website on suspicion it was selling marijuana
through its retail stores).
316. See In re Garden of Eatin’ Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 355, 356–57 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (suggesting
examiner should not have asked General Counsel of FDA whether applicant’s labels for soybean
frozen dessert complied with FDCA, but still upholding examiner’s refusal to register mark
because applicant failed to respond adequately to examiner’s concerns).
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burden of demonstrating its use was lawful? 317 What standard of proof
applies to the lawful use requirement? 318
The PTO has further compounded the difficulty by grafting some
poorly defined limitations onto its lawful use requirement. Recall that
the TTAB has insisted that only “material” violations of law warrant
depriving mark owners of their trademark rights. The Agency, however,
has never satisfactorily explained how trademark lawyers—including
its own trademark examiners—are supposed to distinguish “material”
violations of law from immaterial ones. Instead, the TTAB has offered
unhelpful generalities, suggesting, for example, that a “material”
violation of law is one that is “of such gravity and significance . . . so
tainted that, as a matter of law, it could create no trademark rights.” 319
The Agency has fared no better in explaining what it means by a “per
se violation of a statute regulating the sale of a party’s goods,” 320
another limitation intended to cabin the scope of the lawful use
requirement. Indeed, the example the Agency has used to illustrate a
“per se violation” demonstrates that the phrase is nonsensical. In
Satinine, the TTAB offered that a “per se violation” would arise “when
a regulatory statute requires that a party’s labels must be registered
with or approved by the regulatory agency . . . before his goods may
lawfully enter the stream of commerce, and the party has failed to
obtain such registration or approval.” 321 It is difficult to see what makes
this “per se violation” of a statute different from any other violation of
a statute. The example seems to suggest that a “per se violation” occurs
when a statute is violated, making the term “per se” redundant. 322 (To
be fair to the PTO, the same criticism has been levied against the “per
se” moniker in antitrust law, where the phrase is commonly used and

317. Compare Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 700,
707 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (suggesting “the burden is on opposer to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that applicant’s use has been unlawful”), with AFAB Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Pac-West
Distrib. NV LLC, No. 91224268, 2016 WL 2866564, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May 4, 2016) (seemingly placing
burden on applicant to produce affirmative evidence showing that its use was lawful by denying
applicant’s motion for summary judgment, even though there was “no evidence that the goods
identified in the application are per se unlawful”). The inconsistency between the two cases is
discussed more fully infra note 340.
318. See cases discussed infra notes 340–341 and accompanying text.
319. Gen. Mills Inc. v. Health Valley Foods, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1270, 1274 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
320. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 964 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
321. Id.; see also Gen. Mills, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) at 1276 n.8 (“Per se violations . . . are those
where a clear violation of law, such as the sale or transportation of a controlled substance in
violation of law, is evident in the record.”).
322. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses
with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 171 (1988) (“To say that behavior that violates the
antitrust laws is a ‘per se violation’ makes the phrase ‘per se’ redundant.”).
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from whence the PTO may have borrowed the phrase. 323) In short, the
PTO’s limitations have added additional queries—Was a violation
“material”? Was it a “per se violation” violation? Etc.—to the long list of
questions lawyers must address when applying the lawful use
requirement.
Addressing these questions makes trademark proceedings more
cumbersome and costly affairs. 324 The lawful use requirement forces
trademark attorneys to spend time researching and analyzing issues
that are peripheral—to put it mildly—to the core concerns of trademark
law. In fact, precisely because these issues are outside the expertise of
most trademark lawyers, the cost of addressing them in a trademark
proceeding could be considerable.
The additional cost of applying the lawful use requirement is
most unwelcome in a trademark system that is already struggling to
keep up with heavy demand for trademark registration. The PTO has
very limited resources for administering the trademark system, a
system that must process more than seven-hundred thousand new
trademark filings annually. 325 It has been estimated that the Agency’s
trademark examiners can devote, on average, only two hours total to
each new trademark filing, during which the examiner must perform
the “monumental” task of determining “use, distinctiveness, and
whether the mark is available or likely to be confused with any of the
millions of marks on the Principal Register.” 326 Simply put, the task of
deciding whether or not a mark comports with the express terms of the
Lanham Act is challenging enough without also having to consider
whether the sale or transportation of some product bearing that mark
complies with every other federal statute on the books.
The burden associated with enforcing the lawful use
requirement not only gives the PTO a good reason to reject the
requirement today, it also might help explain why Congress removed
language denying “unlawful businesses” trademark rights when it
passed the Lanham Act in 1946. When Congress adopted earlier
323. Id. at 171–72 (explaining that the phrase “per se violation” in antitrust has “no
ascertainable meaning or utility,” is not “helpful,” and “makes no sense”).
324. See MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 19:123 (remarking that CreAgri unlawful use defense
makes “trademark litigation more complicated and more expensive for trademark owners”). Even
the PTO has acknowledged the “extreme difficulty” the requirement poses for the Agency. Great
Adirondack Steak & Seafood Cafe, Inc., No. 91219162, 2017 WL 3670296, at *3 (T.T.A.B. June 8,
2017).
325. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., FY 2020 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 35
(2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY20PAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YW84-YQZL]; id. at 17 (reporting that PTO employed 622 trademark examiners
in fiscal year 2020).
326. Gerhardt, supra note 267, at 660.
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trademark legislation that included the “unlawful business” language,
the corpus of federal law—and thus, the burden of judging compliance
with that law—was still relatively modest. By the time Congress was
drafting the Lanham Act, however, circumstances had changed
markedly. The corpus of federal law had grown dramatically during the
New Deal, and there was no end in sight to this expansion. The passage
of legislation, like the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, may have
convinced Congress to rethink the wisdom of asking a trademark
agency to police compliance with all federal laws. Although there is no
legislative history on point, it seems reasonable to suppose that
Congress may have wanted the PTO to focus its attention on
trademarks and not to get distracted by an ever-expanding array of
compliance issues far beyond the ken of trademark officials.
Even the TTAB has acknowledged that “there is a serious
question as to the advisability of our attempting to adjudicate whether
a party’s use in commerce is in compliance with [a] particular
regulatory act,” given the “almost endless number of such acts which
the Board might in the future be compelled to interpret.” 327 But rather
than abandon the lawful use requirement in light of such misgivings,
the Agency has adhered to the notion that “trademark rights cannot
accrue from” unlawful acts, 328 and thus, that it must judge the
lawfulness of the commerce in which a mark has been used,
notwithstanding the costs. The TTAB has even lamented that it cannot
rely on other agencies to perform this task, even though those other
agencies undoubtedly “possess[ ] the necessary expertise” the PTO lacks
concerning the statute(s) they administer. 329 In particular, the PTO has
complained that because other agencies do not investigate every
violation of the statutes they administer, or conduct those
investigations too slowly, the PTO often must judge for itself whether
or not a mark owner has behaved lawfully when selling its wares. 330
Of course, if the Lanham Act does not condition trademark
rights on compliance with nontrademark laws, there is no need for the
PTO—or anyone else, for that matter—to engage in this burdensome
task. In other words, given the lack of any textual basis for the
requirement, the substantial costs associated with administering the
lawful use requirement are entirely unnecessary.

327. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Produits et Appareils
de Beaute (Satinine v. P.A.B.), 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 958, 964 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
328. Id. at 966 (Lefkowitz, Member, concurring).
329. See id. at 967.
330. Id. (remarking that other agencies “may take a considerable length of time” to conduct
their investigations, if they undertake them at all).
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D. Arbitrary
In addition to the burden just described, the lawful use
requirement imposes a second type of cost on the trademark system.
Due to the complexity of and imprecise limits on the requirement, the
PTO has struggled to apply the requirement consistently in trademark
proceedings. Indeed, the TTAB’s lawful use jurisprudence is replete
with decisions that are difficult to reconcile. 331
Consider, first, the TTAB’s application of the “materiality”
requirement. In General Mills, the TTAB suggested that a cereal
maker’s failure to include nutritional information on boxes of cereal it
sold—in plain violation of the FDCA—was not material, and thus, did
not warrant cancellation of the mark. 332 But in a variety of other cases
the Agency has held that nearly identical labeling defects, even ones
violating the same statute, justified refusing registration. For example,
in Stellar, the Agency refused registration of a mark used on breath
freshener only because the applicant had neglected to list the weight of
the product on its packaging, in apparent violation of the FDCA. 333
Likewise, in another case, the TTAB refused registration of a mark used
on meat products, only because the applicant neglected to list all of the
ingredients on its packages, again in violation of the FDCA. 334
The Agency has struggled to apply other limitations consistently
as well, including its demand that a violation must bear “some
nexus . . . [to] the use of the mark.” 335 In Satinine, the TTAB looked
askance at a cosmetic company’s alleged violation of federal labeling
laws, in part because the Agency felt that violation (somehow) lacked
331. The inconsistencies resemble the PTO’s “haphazard record of enforcement” of the nowdefunct bars on registration of disparaging, scandalous, and immoral marks. See Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756–57 (2017); see also, e.g., Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Immoral or
Scandalous Marks: An Empirical Analysis, 8 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 169, 172 (2019)
(reporting study results showing “PTO applies the immoral-or-scandalous prohibition in an
arbitrary and viewpoint-discriminatory matter”); Megan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An
Empirical Study of Scandalous Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 359–62 (2015)
(reporting study results showing “some measure of inconsistency” in Office Action decisions for
certain controversial words); Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare:
Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1478 (2011) (finding
inconsistences in PTO registration decisions regarding a particular scandalous acronym).
332. Gen. Mills Inc. v. Health Valley Foods, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1270 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
333. In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 48 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
334. In re Taylor, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 490 (T.T.A.B. 1962); see also, e.g., In re Garden of Eatin’
Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 355 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (refusing registration because of FDCA labeling
violation); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 400 (T.T.A.B. 1976) (same); Horany v. Hays,
176 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 316 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (same). Although some of TTAB’s labeling decisions
predated General Mills, the TTAB did not disavow them in that decision or otherwise suggest that
they were no longer binding precedent.
335. Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 967 (Kera, Member, concurring).
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the requisite “nexus” to the company’s use of its mark. 336 But in other
cases, the Agency has seemingly forgotten about this supposed
limitation on the lawful use requirement. Perhaps most notably, the
TTAB has repeatedly refused to register marks used on marijuana
products, 337 without ever explaining how violations of the CSA related
to the use of the marks—in fact, the Agency has never even mentioned
the “nexus” requirement in a marijuana mark decision. To be sure, the
marks were affixed to (i.e., used on) goods sold in violation of the CSA.
But if the nexus test is supposed to limit the scope of the lawful use
requirement, it must demand something more than that; otherwise,
every sale of a trademarked good in violation of a nontrademark law
would satisfy the nexus test, including the sale of the mislabeled
cosmetics in Satinine.
The TTAB has struggled to apply even the most basic
limitation—the notion that the lawful use requirement applies only to
violations of federal law. Notwithstanding this limitation, the TTAB
has inexplicably heard—and often upheld—challenges to marks based
on accusations that mark owners had violated only state laws. 338 The
discrepancies regarding this limitation even led one federal court to
declare recently that “it appears unsettled whether this unlawful use
theory applies only to laws of the United States, or whether it would
apply equally to uses that violate state laws.” 339 In short, in seeking to
limit the scope of the lawful use requirement, the Agency has merely
replaced one set of problems (undue expense and harshness) with
another one (arbitrariness).

336. Id.
337. See supra note 280.
338. E.g., Facial Aesthetic Ctr. of Excellence Grp., Inc. v. Stewart Wang, M.D., Inc., No.
92044775, 2006 WL 3296210, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2006) (denying motion for summary
judgment because there was genuine issue of material fact regarding whether respondent had
violated state law); Geraghty Dyno-Tuned Prods., Inc. v. Clayton Mfg. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 508
(T.T.A.B. 1976) (dismissing petition to cancel based on violation of state vehicle code); State Hist.
Soc’y of Wis. v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 25
(T.T.A.B. 1976) (investigating alleged violation of state licensing law, but finding law not violated);
Pet Inc. v. Bassetti, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BL) 911 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (similar).
Some claims may prove difficult to classify as involving violations of state or federal law. For
example, in John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc., the TTAB affirmed a refusal to register
the mark HERE’S JOHNNY based on the applicant’s alleged violation of a federal court order,
even though the order enjoined applicant from violating a state law right of publicity. 94
U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1942 (T.T.A.B. 2010). The affirmance is in tension with TTAB holdings suggesting
the lawful use requirement applies only to violations of federal laws. After all, one wonders
whether the PTO would have reached the same result had the injunction been issued by a state
court instead.
339. See Veronica’s Auto Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Veronica’s Servs., Inc., No. EDCV 13–01327
(DTBx), 2014 WL 7149530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014).
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The TTAB’s procedural decisions have been similarly
haphazard. In opposition proceedings, for example, it is unclear
whether the opposer bears the burden of demonstrating the applicant’s
sales were unlawful, or whether the applicant must prove its sales were
lawful. There is precedent favoring each of these mutually incompatible
views. 340 The TTAB has also defined the burden of proof differently
across cases, sometimes describing it as a “preponderance of the
evidence” standard, and sometimes describing it as a more demanding
“clear and convincing” evidence standard. 341 (The TTAB’s practice of
designating many of its decisions as “Non-Precedential” has probably
contributed to the inconsistencies across cases. 342)
By calling attention to the inconsistencies in the TTAB’s lawful
use decisions, I am not seeking to malign the Agency. Rather, I
highlight the inconsistencies to suggest that the requirement demands
too much of the PTO. It forces the Agency to address thorny legal issues
far beyond the expertise of trademark lawyers, issues the Agency
acknowledges it is not properly equipped to address.
The arbitrariness in the TTAB’s decisions should be considered
another “cost” of the lawful use requirement. The requirement is unfair
to those trademark owners who have been denied trademark rights, or
340. In Weight Watchers, for example, the TTAB held that the opposer bore the burden of
demonstrating that applicant had sold its WEIGHT WISE food products “for the purpose of
controlling body weight.” Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BL)
700, 707 (T.T.A.B. 1981). The applicant’s purpose was critical because the FDCA required food
sold “for the purpose of controlling body weight” to bear special nutritional labels, which applicant
had not attached to its products. Id. The TTAB further held that opposer had failed to meet its
burden because it offered no evidence—other than the mark itself—to show that applicant had
marketed its products for “dietary use.” Id.
By contrast, in AFAB, the TTAB seemingly put the onus on applicant to prove that it had sold
its SUPER RUSH isobutyl nitrites for use as an all-purpose cleaner, as it claimed in its filing,
rather than for human consumption—i.e., as a drug, as opposer claimed. AFAB Indus. Servs., Inc.
v. Pac-West Distrib. NV LLC, No. 91224268, 2016 WL 2866564 (T.T.A.B. May 4, 2016). Selling the
chemical for the latter purpose would violate the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1984. Even though
opposer offered no evidence to substantiate its accusation—again, apart from the mark itself—the
TTAB still refused to dismiss the opposition because applicant had produced “no evidence that the
goods identified in its application comply” with the Act. Id. at *3.
341. Compare Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 707 (“preponderance of the
evidence”), with Satinine, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BL) at 965 (“clear and convincing evidence”).
342. Such a claim has been made regarding nonprecedential (unpublished) judicial decisions.
See Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT.
L. REV. 555, 594–95 (2005) (“By making it less likely that judges will have the opportunity and
incentive to know and to harmonize the reasoning and results of all similar cases, citation bans
work against consistency of outcomes in all routine cases.”); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common
Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 786 (2003) (“[A]rbitrariness
and inconsistency are avoided only by means of a precedential system in which each appellate
panel’s decision, conscientiously explained in a published decision, is available for
consultation . . . .”); Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished
Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 567–82 (2020) (identifying
common flaws in unpublished decisions).
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who have been forced to endure lengthy litigation to vindicate those
rights, when other, similarly situated parties have not. 343 The
requirement also discourages mark owners from seeking registration of
their marks, a choice that impairs the function and societal value of the
registration system. 344 At the extreme, the requirement could even
diminish the incentives for mark owners to invest in their marks. After
all, if mark owners cannot reliably predict whether the TTAB will
register or cancel a mark, then they also cannot reliably predict whether
they will be able to capture the goodwill associated with the mark.
E. Meddlesome
There is one final argument against the wisdom of the lawful use
requirement. The requirement not only undermines the administration
of the Lanham Act, as just discussed, but it could undermine the
sensible administration of other federal laws as well. Pursuant to the
requirement, the PTO has taken upon itself to investigate and to
sanction—by denying trademark registration—violations of a wide
range of nontrademark laws. Congress, however, has entrusted the
administration of those statutes to other federal agencies, and those
agencies (and Congress) may not appreciate the PTO’s meddling.
By the PTO’s own admission, other agencies have more expertise
concerning the various statutes that trigger the lawful use
requirement. 345 Those agencies also generally enjoy broad discretion
regarding how best to execute those statutes, including, importantly,
how and even whether to pursue violations of them. 346 Exercising that
discretion, agencies may decline to sanction violations for any number
of legitimate reasons, including the belief that imposing sanctions in a
given case would not serve the purposes of the statute in question. 347
Yet the PTO has failed to give due deference to the choices other
agencies make when they administer their statutes. 348 Indeed, the PTO
343. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 596 (1987) (“[D]ecisions that are
not consistent are, for that reason, unfair, unjust, or simply wrong.”).
344. Cf. Beebe, supra note 18, at 776 (surmising that a “mark holder may rationally forego the
opportunity to register a mark unless it is reasonably certain that the application will succeed”);
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 898 (remarking that a decision to forego registration “is contrary to the
overall information-disclosure purposes of the registration system”).
345. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
346. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (recognizing that “an agency’s decision
not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
discretion”).
347. For an analysis of the reasons agencies decline to pursue violations of statutes, see
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014).
348. I found only one lawful use case in which the TTAB appeared to look askance at a possible
violation because another agency, more “intimately involved” with the violation, was
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insists upon imposing trademark sanctions even when other agencies
have chosen not to pursue the same violations. For example, the TTAB
has recently refused to register marks used on state-approved
marijuana products because the sale of marijuana violates the federal
CSA, 349 even though the DOJ—the agency primarily responsible for
administering the CSA—strongly disavowed any intent to enforce the
statute against such sales. 350 Even after Congress endorsed this
nonenforcement policy and barred the DOJ from prosecuting stateapproved marijuana sales, 351 the TTAB held its ground and continued
to bar registration of marijuana marks, viewing Congress’s choice,
again, as irrelevant. 352
By ignoring the choices made by other agencies and by Congress,
the PTO disturbs carefully orchestrated enforcement regimes. Consider
again the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy toward marijuana. The DOJ
based this policy in part on the belief that the states were best
positioned to regulate marijuana sales and protect consumers, thereby
making imposition of harsh federal sanctions under the CSA
unnecessary. 353 But by refusing registration of marks used by the statelicensed marijuana industry, the PTO may have undermined the
premise of the DOJ policy. As discussed above, the lawful use
requirement enables blatant cross-border infringement of marijuana
marks. 354 Although such infringement threatens to confuse consumers,
there is little the states can do about it individually—e.g., a state cannot
stop use of a mark outside of its borders. Thus, by disregarding the
“apparently satisfied” after registrant destroyed goods it had shipped unlawfully. Zao Gruppa
Predpriyatij Ost v. Vosk Int’l Co., No. 91168423, 2011 WL 3828709, at *22 n.52 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9,
2011).
349. See sources cited supra note 280.
350. The DOJ announced its intentions in an enforcement memorandum issued in 2013.
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys 3 (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5X4SCEV]) (discouraging federal prosecutors from taking legal action against marijuana traffickers
who comply with “strong and effective” state regulations). The TTAB ignored the memorandum,
viewing it as irrelevant for purposes of the lawful use requirement. See In re PharmaCann LLC,
123 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) 1122, 1128 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (“We must determine the eligibility of marijuanarelated marks for federal registration by reference to the CSA as it is written, not as it might be
enforced at any point in time by any particular Justice Department.”).
351. Congress has done so by attaching riders to the DOJ’s annual budget. Those riders bar
the Agency from prosecuting individuals for actions that comply with state medical marijuana
laws. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–79 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing spending
riders and their legal significance).
352. In re PharmaCann, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d (BL) at 1128.
353. See Memorandum from James M. Cole to All U.S. Att’ys, supra note 350, at 2 (noting that
the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy “rests on its expectation that [legalization] states . . . will
implement strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems that will address the threat
those state laws could pose to public safety, public health, and other law enforcement interests”).
354. See supra notes 282–286 and accompanying text.
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enforcement choices made by the DOJ and Congress, the PTO may have
undermined—not advanced—the goals of the CSA.
The PTO lawful use requirement also undercuts the
administration of other statutes in a second, less obvious way. Because
the requirement may be invoked by private litigants, it may create a de
facto private cause of action under statutes that do not otherwise
provide for any private enforcement. 355 For example, there is no private
cause of action under the CSA, 356 but by making violations of the CSA
grounds for challenging a mark, the PTO has effectively given private
parties a role to play in the enforcement of federal drug laws. While
those private parties cannot criminally prosecute CSA violations, they
can use the deprivation of trademark rights to sanction a rival’s
violations of the statute. And there is nothing the DOJ—the agency
responsible for administering the statute—can do to stop them.
Although denying trademark rights disrupts enforcement of
federal regulations of commerce, registering marks used in unlawful
commerce would not. Registration in no way impedes other federal
agencies from sanctioning violations of the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. For example, registration confers no immunity from
prosecution. Neither does the act of registration necessarily help a mark
owner to commit violations of nontrademark laws. 357 The doomsday
scenario posited by the TTAB in Satinine, that, without the lawful use
requirement, it might be forced to register a mark on heroin, 358 is a red
herring. Consider that to register a mark on that drug, a mark owner
would need to admit, on the record, that it had committed a felony (the
sale of heroin) for which it could be imprisoned up to twenty years (even
more for more than minimal quantities). 359 No one is likely to do that,
at least while the DOJ continues to prosecute heroin offenses. 360
(Parties are willing to do that for marijuana only because the DOJ and
Congress have decided marijuana crimes will not be prosecuted.) And if
the unthinkable does happen, the PTO could register the mark on
heroin, and then forward the offending application to the DOJ and let
355. Rabe, supra note 26, at 334 (asking whether lawful use requirement could provide “a
‘back door’ for the enforcement of federal statutes with no private cause of action”).
356. E.g., Smith v. Hickenlooper, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1290 (D. Colo. 2016) (noting that
“federal courts have uniformly held that the CSA does not create a private right of action”), aff’d
sub nom. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017).
357. Even if trademarks might sometimes facilitate unlawful sales, the TTAB does not limit
application of the lawful use requirement to cases where that danger is actually present. See supra
notes 336–337 and accompanying text (highlighting inconsistent application of TTAB’s nexus test).
358. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
359. 21 U.S.C. § 841(C) (listing criminal punishments for drug offenses).
360. There is a reason Walter White never sought to register HEISENBERG as a mark for use
on meth.
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that Agency decide how best to handle the violation; there is no need
for the PTO to investigate, adjudicate, and sanction a drug law violation
itself.
F. Summary
The lawful use requirement is an unwise addition to federal
trademark policy. The requirement stokes consumer confusion; it
unfairly strips mark owners of the ability to protect their brand names
and any benefits associated therewith; it greatly complicates
registration proceedings, thereby adding to the cost of those
proceedings; it introduces new arbitrariness into TTAB decisions, as the
Agency struggles to apply the doctrine’s complicated and ill-defined
rules consistently; and it upsets the enforcement regimes Congress has
designed for nontrademark laws. Recognizing these costs, it becomes
apparent why the Congress that passed the Lanham Act would not have
given the PTO authority to deny trademark registration based on
violations of nontrademark laws. But by highlighting these costs, this
Part has also shown why the PTO and the courts should not demand
lawful use, even if they had been given the authority to do so.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The lawful use requirement has no place in trademark law.
Limiting the doctrine would not go far enough. 361 For one thing, the
PTO has no more statutory authority to impose a narrow lawful use
requirement than it does a broad one. In any event, limiting the
doctrine would not reduce all the costs associated with it. As explained
above, the limitations the PTO has previously grafted onto the
requirement have greatly complicated the doctrine, thereby adding to
its burdensomeness and arbitrariness. Nor would it be possible to work
around the requirement without abolishing it. 362 Simply put, the lawful
use requirement must go.

361. Some commentators have suggested tweaking the requirement, but not abandoning it
outright. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 285, at 597–98 (suggesting requirement should not apply
to sales of marijuana); Rabe, supra note 26, at 334–47 (recommending changes to make
requirement more suitable for infringement litigation).
362. A few scholars have devised ways to evade or lessen the impact of the requirement, but
their suggestions remain untested and are intended to benefit the cannabis industry, not all mark
owners. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 285, at 169 (suggesting states could form agreements
recognizing cannabis marks used in other states); Sam Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark
Laundering, Useless Patents, and Other IP Challenges for the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 217, 248–49 (2016) (suggesting marijuana firms could lessen impact of requirement
by registering their marks for use on nonmarijuana goods like t-shirts).
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This Part briefly outlines two plausible ways the requirement
could be excised from federal trademark law. 363 First, the PTO could
voluntarily abolish the requirement for use in trademark registration
proceedings. To make that happen, the PTO should initiate rulemaking
proceedings to repeal Rule 2.69. 364 In addition, the TTAB should
expressly hold in a registration proceeding that compliance with
nontrademark laws is no longer a distinct requirement for registration.
Ideally, the Board would also expressly overturn or disavow precedents,
like Coahoma and Stellar, that created and affirmed the
requirement. 365 But however it is done, the Agency needs to make clear
that it will no longer refuse or cancel registrations just because a mark
owner has violated some nontrademark statute. 366
The change in policy would not only put the Agency back in
compliance with the Lanham Act, but it would also alleviate the many
harms that stem from the ill-considered requirement. For example,
trademark examiners would no longer need to worry about the
lawfulness of the “use in commerce” cited in any of the more than sevenhundred thousand trademark applications submitted every year. Of
course, the change would mean that the PTO would have to register a
mark, even when it knows that an applicant violated some other law
when selling its trademarked goods. But if the PTO is sufficiently
concerned by a possible violation, it could bring the matter to the
attention of whatever agency is tasked with enforcing that law. The
important point is, the PTO does not need to investigate, adjudicate,
and sanction the violation itself. In fact, the PTO is overstepping its
statutory authority when it does so, and for no good reason.
Second, if the PTO does not abolish the lawful use requirement
on its own, the courts should invalidate the Agency’s requirement at the
next available opportunity—i.e., the next time a dissatisfied party
363. Congress could also amend the Lanham Act to make it clear(er) that the statute does not
demand lawful use for registration of a mark. Given the difficulty of moving any legislation
through Congress, however, it seems unrealistic to expect Congress to fix the PTO’s mistake.
364. Interestingly, in 1978, a committee formed by the Secretary of Commerce recommended
repeal of Rule 2.69, because the PTO “should not concern itself with the policing of other statutes.”
Report of the Public Advisory Committee for Trademark Affairs, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 660, 664
(1978).
365. Curiously, the Board’s procedural manual does not even contemplate the possibility the
Agency might change its interpretation of the Lanham Act sua sponte (i.e., without being
compelled to do so by a court). See TMEP, supra note 60, § 1217 (acknowledging only that the
Board may depart from precedent when new facts or changed circumstances warrant).
366. Even when the Board has modified the lawful use requirement in the past—for example,
by recognizing new limits thereon—it has not expressly disavowed prior decisions in tension with
the new limits. See supra notes 332–334. The failure to clarify the status of earlier decisions has
contributed to the uncertainty and arbitrariness surrounding the requirement, and thus should be
avoided going forward.
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appeals from a lawful use decision of the TTAB. 367 Although parties
have been reluctant to appeal from TTAB lawful use decisions in the
past, this Article lays the groundwork for a successful challenge.
Indeed, this may be the ideal time to mount such a challenge. As noted
in the Introduction, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest the courts
are open to reexamining even “well-settled” trademark doctrines. And
since the courts do not defer to the PTO’s legal decisions, 368 nothing
should prevent a court from holding that the lawful use requirement is
ultra vires and thus unenforceable. In other words, the path for
mounting a successful legal challenge to the lawful use requirement is
clear. All that is needed is a party willing to pursue it.
Of course, there would be additional issues for the courts and the
PTO to resolve once they have excised the lawful use requirement from
the trademark registration system. For example, they would need to
decide whether to make the change retroactive, a decision that could
have important ramifications for priority over marks previously denied
registration on lawful use grounds. 369 Likewise, courts that have
recognized it may want to revisit the unlawful use defense in trademark
infringement litigation. While courts, unlike the PTO, have some
statutory authority to recognize equitable defenses like clean hands, the
unlawful use defense might exceed the scope of that authority, 370 and it
generates many of the policy concerns raised by the lawful use
requirement. But these are issues for another day. For now, suffice to
367. Ideally, the Federal Circuit would take up the issue, since the Board considers itself
bound by that court in all registration proceedings. See supra note 159.
368. See supra note 132. To be sure, commentators disagree about the degree of deference
courts owe PTO interpretations of the Lanham Act. Compare Gerhardt, supra note 267, at 644–45
(offering several reasons why “federal courts should be particularly cautious about deferring to
USPTO trademark decisions”), with Wasserman, supra note 65, at 1514 (suggesting the “Federal
Circuit fails to afford the Trademark Office sufficient deference with respect to both the Agency’s
legal and factual determinations”). For present purposes, however, the disagreement is
immaterial, because the precise level of deference accorded the PTO is unlikely to change a court’s
determination that the Agency’s lawful use requirement is unauthorized.
369. For one cogent approach to addressing questions of retroactivity spawned by changes to
law, see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1055 (1997).
370. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. For example, a broad “unlawful use defense”
obviates the need for the other, narrower defenses Congress specifically enumerated in section
33(b). Most relevantly, for present purposes, section 33(b)(7) provides a defense against
infringement of a mark that “has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7). Since a broad “unlawful use defense” could be triggered by
violations of antitrust laws (among other statutes), it arguably makes the section 33(b)(7) defense
superfluous and the many limits imposed thereon ineffective. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that to prevail on section
33(b)(7) defense, defendant must show that plaintiff’s mark was the “fundamental vehicle required
and used to accomplish the violation”); Cott Beverage Corp. v. Can. Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F.
Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that antitrust defense “deprives a misuser of a trade-mark
of certain evidentiary advantages, but it does not strip him of his trade-mark”).
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say that there is no insurmountable barrier to abolishing the PTO’s
lawful use requirement in registration proceedings.
In demanding compliance with sundry nontrademark laws, the
PTO has lost sight of the statute it is supposed to administer. The
Lanham Act does not require lawful use for registration, nor should it.
Making registration or protection conditional on compliance with
nontrademark laws does nothing to further the aims of trademark law.
To refocus the PTO’s attention on the core issues of trademark law, the
lawful use requirement must go.

